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CHAPTER 1: 
Influenza and Spanish Flu 
Introduction 
As America struggled against Germany's armies in the fall of 1918, absorbed in 
churning out a great stream of men and materiel for the Western front, a silent, invisible 
enemy struck. For the next eight months, belligerent and neutral nations alike would 
be under siege by the same deadly and implacable foe-the Spanish influenza virus. 
By the time it was over, the pandemic caused by the virus would kill more civilians and 
soldiers worldwide than the war itself had done, and it would do so in a much shorter 
time. Indianapolis fared better than many other cities that autumn, but nonetheless 
experienced the loss of over one thousand of its residents to influenza and the pneu-
monia that so often followed it. How the Spanish flu pandemic came to Indiana; what 
actions doctors, health officials, and others took to stop it; and how the public re-
sponded to these actions is the subject of this thesis. 1 
The narrative begins with a history of influenza from classical times to the 
present and then describes how the first wave of Spanish influenza developed into a 
pandemic that circled the globe between March and August 1918. Chapter 2 takes up 
the story of the second wave of the disease that began in September in Boston military 
camps, spread to the civilian population of the Northeast, and quickly reached the 
Midwest. On its sweep through the heartland, Spanish flu infected civilians in India-
napolis, soldiers at Fort Benjamin Harrison, and trainees at various military detach-
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ments established in the city, as well as all other parts of Indiana. Chapter 3 examines 
in detail the response of public health officials and others to the crisis-the use of health 
information, a stringent closing ban, the enforced wearing of masks in public, and the 
mobilization of resources to fight the spread of the disease. Chapter 4 is devoted to 
placing the pandemic in the context of public health, medicine, and science, and existing 
health practices and beliefs, and to assessing the utility of prevention and treatment 
methods used to fight Spanish flu. This chapter also examines the impact of the disease, 
both in terms of lives lost and the personal and social costs of so sudden and cataclysmic 
an event. 
There have been many other epidemics and pandemics throughout history, most 
notably the Black Death in medieval and early modern Etlrope, cholera in nineteenth-
century Europe and America, and yellow fever in colonial and early nineteenth-century 
America. But compared even to these deadly outbreaks of disease, the Spanish 
influenza pandemic was uniquely devastating because of its rapid spread to virtually 
every inhabited part of the world, the enormous number of people it infected in a very 
short time, and the tragic consequences of its propensity for killing young adults. 2 
Without question the Great Pandemic was a major calamity, overshadowed only by the 
Great War itself. 
Methodology 
The Spanish influenza epidemic in Indianapolis was not well documented by 
those who experienced it. A thorough search of local resources revealed no first-person 
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accounts of the epidemic. The only primary sources of information about Spanish flu 
in Indianapolis were microfilms of contemporary newspapers, reports of the U.S. 
Census Bureau and the Indiana State Board of Health, and issues of the Indianapolis 
Medical Journal. Of these, the most valuable by far were the Indianapolis Star and the 
Indianapolis News, both of which published many articles about the flu and its victims 
during this health crisis. 
The City-County Council Minutes Book, September-December 1918, and the 
Marion County Commissioners Record Book for the same period make no mention of 
the flu epidemic, nor did research in manuscript collections at the Indiana State Library 
reveal any references to Spanish flu. This was disappointing because multiple sources 
of primary data would have been preferable to a single"'one. However, the fact that 
newspaper articles proved to be the principal resource does offer several advantages 
over diaries, hospital records, and so on. Newspapers give past events a sense of 
immediacy because much of their social and cultural context is preserved through 
advertisements, sports and entertainment sections, classified ads, photographs, and 
obituaries. Another advantage is that the researcher can gain some understanding of 
how events might have appeared to people experiencing them. In 1918 when newspa-
pers and magazines were still the sole sources of information about current events 
available to the general public, they were able to define events and shape the public 
perception of them much as television news does today. Of course, newspapers are not 
an exact analogue of television; the two media differ markedly in their respective 
capabilities to saturate public consciousness. Further, unlike radio and television, 
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newspapers were directly accessible only to the literate and to those willing to take the 
time to read their contents. 
A disadvantage of so voluminous a primary source is that research and analysis 
proved quite laborious. The newspaper index at the Indiana State Library listed only 
a handful of articles about the epidemic that appeared in the Indianapolis Star and the 
Indianapolis News, so it was necessary to look through the entire microfilm of each 
day's paper in search of news items about Spanish flu. Indianapolis had two major 
dailies in 1918, and in order to avoid duplication, research consisted of alternately 
scanning the News and the Star for one-week periods. The News was not published on 
Sundays, so the Star is over-represented as a result. By the time the research was 
finished, hundreds of articles and news items about the Spanish flu shed considerable 
light on the epidemic and imparted a sense of the social climate that prevailed at the 
end of World War I. 
The Indianapolis newspapers contained a great deal of information about the 
epidemic's progress at the national, state, and local levels, in the military training camps, 
and to a lesser extent in foreign countries. The primary sources of news regarding the 
progress of the epidemic in Indianapolis and Indiana that were available to reporters 
were the Indiana and Indianapolis boards of health. Otherwise, news of the flu situation 
in the state probably came from a wire service. Coverage outside Indianapolis was 
uneven both geographically and chronologically, so it would not be possible to recon-
struct the progress of the epidemic elsewhere in the state without resorting to the same 
process used for Indianapolis, searching through microfilmed copies of newspapers 
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from other cities in Indiana. Another interesting note regarding coverage is that after 
late October 1918 the Indianapolis newspapers printed few items about influenza in 
other regions of the country, and very little at any time about the pandemic in any city 
or military camp further west than Chicago. 
Of Indiana's ninety-two counties, only seventy-seven are mentioned in the 
editions of the Star and News used for data. Some cities and counties were reported 
on frequently, while others received scant attention, but the reasons for differences in 
coverage are not apparent. For example, it might be assumed that the health status of 
the communities nearest Indianapolis would have been of greatest interest to local 
readers, but this was not borne out by newspaper coverage. Nearly every county in the 
state suffered the ravages of Spanish influenza at one time or another between October 
and December, but very few references to influenza in Boone and Morgan counties 
appeared in the Star and News, while Shelby County received intense coverage 
throughout the course of the epidemic, and Hamilton, Hancock, Hendricks, and 
Johnson counties fell between these two extremes in terms of the number of news items. 
However, even if they are not a complete and perfect record of the epidemic, the 
newspapers nonetheless provide an interesting and valuable snapshot of the events in 
Indianapolis during this time of crisis. 
History of Influenza 
The disease now called influenza has occurred periodically since ancient times. 
The term influenza was first used in 1504 when a flu outbreak in Italy was attributed by 
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adherents of the miasma theory of disease to the malevolent influence-in Italian, 
influenza-of heavenly bodies. The term "influenza di freddo," influence of the cold, 
was sometimes used as well when referring to this disease. During the eighteenth 
century, the French began calling the disease grippe (from gripper, to grip), a term that 
became popular in America. But the name influenza, adopted by the English during a 
flu epidemic in 1742-43, came to be generally accepted. 3 
It is sometimes difficult to identify diseases from historical accounts, not only 
because the diagnostic language of past eras may be quite unintelligible to people living 
in later times, but also because diseases can disappear if their causative agent becomes 
extinct. For example, the plague that afflicted the Athenians during the Peloponesian 
War has never been identified; the symptoms Thucydides so clearly described match 
those of no disease known today, so it is possible that the bacteria or virus causing it 
mutated or died out. 4 Unlike the Athenian ailment, influenza has displayed stable and 
distinctive characteristics over time and can therefore be easily identified retrospec-
tively. It has typically been described as a mild disease, which has a sudden onset, a 
fever that usually lasts about three days, a dry cough, headache, backache, and aching 
legs, followed by weakness and depression lasting a week or more. An epidemic often 
starts suddenly and spreads throughout an entire country within a month or so, affecting 
people of all ages and classes. Large numbers of people are infected, but the relatively 
few who die tend to be the very young, the elderly, or chronically ill persons. 5 
Hippocrates and Livy independently recorded an epidemic, occurring in 412 
B.C., which is one of the first that can be identified as flu. Medieval chroniclers 
6 
frequently mentioned what appears to have been influenza epidemics, but there is no 
record of an influenza pandemic-an extremely widespread epidemic-until 1510, 
when an apparently mild strain spread from Africa to Europe. In 1580 another, more 
widespread, influenza pandemic moved from Asia to Africa, to Europe, and to Amer-
ica. Virtually everyone in its path became ill, but large numbers of deaths occurred 
only in certain cities, such as Rome, where 9,000 people died from the malady. 6 
Like the other diseases of the Old World, influenza wreaked havoc among native 
Americans, who lacked immunity to the microbes that accompanied European explor-
ers and colonists. Influenza appeared among Indian populations at the same time as 
measles and smallpox and proved equally lethal to them. The conquistadors probably 
brought influenza to Mexico, where it swept through Aztec territory in 1559 and killed 
many Indians who had escaped the earlier ravages of typhus and other diseases. 
Influenza was prevalent along with smallpox in the English colonies in the last years of 
the seventeenth century. Continent-wide influenza outbreaks occurred in North Amer-
ica in 1761 after a measles epidemic and in the years between 1778 and 1783 in 
conjunction with smallpox. 7 
In the nineteenth century flu pandemics occurred in 1800-02, 1830-33, 1836-37, 
1847-48, 1850-51, 1857-58, 1873-75, and 1889-90. All had high morbidity rates, and 
some caused considerable mortality. For example, the pandemic of 1847-48 killed 
more Londoners than the terrible cholera epidemic of 1832, but none rivaled the death 
record of the Great Pandemic of 1918-19. Three distinct waves of Spanish influenza 
swept the globe: a mild one in the spring of 1918, an extremely severe one in the 
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autumn, and a somewhat less severe one early in 1919. All shared the extraordinary 
tendency of being unusually fatal to young adults; throughout the world, half the people 
who died from flu and pneumonia were between twenty and forty. 8 
The world did not experience another influenza pandemic after that until 
1957-58 when the relatively mild Asian flu appeared; it caused no increase in mortality 
in the United States, and was fatal for the most part only to persons over sixty-five. The 
pattern was the same in most countries, but Japan experienced somewhat higher 
mortality rates, and Finland had rates that were much higher. In 1968-69 there were 
major epidemics of Hong Kong flu with attack rates of 30 to 40 percent in Europe and 
the United States, low mortality the first year, but considerable mortality in Europe 
during the flu season of 1969. 9 Swine flu, which health officials believed to be closely 
related to the influenza of 1918, appeared briefly in 1976, but failed to materialize in 
epidemic form. 10 In the fall of 1993 Beijing flu, the most recent viral candidate with 
pandemic potential, happily did not live up to its reputation. 11 
The fearful mortality of the Spanish influenza pandemic stimulated intensive 
research into the cause of the disease. 12 Gradually researchers isolated three types of 
influenza viruses-A, which causes serious pandemics such as that of 1918; B, which is 
more common among children and causes less severe illness; and C, which is quite rare 
and seems to be milder than A or B. 13 They also found that the influenza virus is 
capable of rapid mutation in response to antibodies produced by its hosts. This means 
that immunity developed after a bout with flu provides protection only against the same 
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strain and type should it be encountered again later, but not against new ones that may 
evolve-thus making possible influenza pandemics such as that of 1918. 14 
Public Health and Sanitation in 1918 
In many ways, the United States in 1918 was better prepared to deal with 
contagious disease than it had been at any previous time. Earlier epidemics, such as 
the yellow fever outbreaks of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, had 
been met with little effective organized resistance because of the relatively undevel-
oped state of medical science, and because no agencies or organizations existed that 
had the authority or knowledge to deal with a public health crisis in coordinated fashion . 
.. 
By contrast, by 1918 considerable progress had been made in both public health and 
medical science. Some truly significant medical advances had been made in terms of 
bacteriological disease prevention and cure, and the germ theory of disease, which had 
been accepted for some years by the medical community, was coming to be understood 
in a general way by most educated people. This meant that even though no one knew 
what caused Spanish influenza, the means of its transmission was fairly well understood. 
As far as treatment was concerned, physicians no longer engaged in the harmful 
therapies, such as bleeding or the use of mercury, that had characterized medicine in 
earlier eras. 15 Public health organizations existed at the national, state, and local levels 
throughout the United States and public sanitation regulations were in place in much 
of the country. 16 Unfortunately, medical science had not advanced sufficiently to 
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prevent or cure Spanish influenza and pneumonia, nor were public health officials 
sufficiently experienced in disease control to be able to cope with so daunting a foe. 
The public and personal hygiene movement became firmly established in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. This was a time when the greatest threats to life 
and health were communicable diseases, such as cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, 
tuberculosis, diphtheria, scarlet fever, whooping cough, enteric disorders, measles, and 
malaria. Most of these ailments were centuries-old, so common and familiar that 
people accepted the morbidity and mortality inflicted by them with a certain amount 
of fatalism. By contrast, cholera-unknown in Europe and America before the nine-
teenth century-and yellow fever-a mosquito-borne tropical disease-elicited a near-
hysterical reaction on the part of the public and the demand for official action. 17 
Yellow fever, which had made its first North American appearance in late 
seventeenth century Boston, plagued Atlantic ports for over a century, caused major 
epidemics from 1793 to 1805, and then vanished from the Northeast. It flared up in the 
south Atlantic and Gulf Coast states during the first half of the nineteenth century and 
peaked in the 1850s. In 1853, Louisiana established the first state health board to deal 
with its incursions after nine thousand residents of New Orleans died in a single yellow 
fever epidemic. The disease declined sharply after the Civil War, but remained a threat 
in southern ports as late as 1878, when a devastating epidemic spread to nearly every 
large town on the south Atlantic and Gulf coasts and far up the Mississippi Valley. This 
so aroused the nation that Congress passed the first national quarantine act and created 
the National Board of Health. Neither survived, but public health consciousness had 
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been stimulated, and the way had been paved for creation of the U.S. Public Health 
Service years later. 
Asiatic cholera struck the United States in 1832 and returned in 1848-49, killing 
thousands on both occasions. It too declined in the years following the Civil War, but 
nowhere posed the continual health threat that yellow fever did in the South. Both 
diseases had made such indelible impressions upon the public consciousness during 
their ascendancy that they continued to inspire fear for years afterward. The spread of 
cholera in Europe in 1873 proved so alarming to Americans that the New York City 
Health Department began a major effort to clean up some of the city's most unsanitary 
conditions. The last major cholera scare occurred in 1892 when the disease ravaged 
Russia. Happily, it did not appear in this country, but a'!i this second wave coincided 
with the emerging sanitary movement, it had the salubrious effect of spurring frightened 
American health and municipal authorities in numerous cities to initiate extensive 
sanitation campaigns. In 1887, fear of cholera led to the establishment in New York 
City of the first laboratory in the United States for the routine diagnosis of disease. 
Between 1856 and 1860, conventions of health officials and representatives from 
medical societies were held regularly in response to the dual threat of yellow fever and 
cholera. Participants advocated the establishment of national quarantine laws and 
public health programs, actions that laid the groundwork for the future American 
Public Health Association. 
The European public health movement, upon which the American movement 
was based, had originated in France in the early nineteenth century. The movement 
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was spearheaded by Great Britain in the 1840s and 1850s, and several decades later 
was given fresh impetus when Bismarck fostered public health as a means of strength-
ening the newly united German state. American cities also followed the lead of their 
older European counterparts in the matter of sanitary engineering. Similarly, newer 
American cities in the Midwest and on the West Coast emulated their East Coast 
predecessors, both in public health and sanitation and in the development of water and 
18 
sewer systems. 
City health departments and state boards of health developed in conjunction 
with each other during the last third of the 19th century. Many large and medium-sized 
cities had expanded their old sewer and water systems or built new ones and systema-
tized the collection of garbage and refuse. At the same fime, city health departments 
were increasing the scope of their duties in response to the demands of urban life and 
population growth. However, municipal health officials were frequently unable to 
secure the cooperation of local government officials in enforcing health regulations and 
began to lobby for the creation of state health boards with the authority to force the 
compliance of local communities. The American Public Health Association, estab-
lished in 1872, strongly advocated state boards and in 1875 submitted to all state 
governments a model act for a state health board. This model gave state boards some 
limited powers, but envisioned them primarily as collectors and disseminators of 
information on health and sanitation. Massachusetts had the first effective state board, 
created in 1869; it was followed by California in 1870, the District of Columbia in 1871, 
Minnesota and Virginia in 1872, Michigan in 1873, Maryland in 1874, Alabama in 1875, 
12 
Wisconsin in 1876, and Illinois in 1877. By 1900 most states had health boards-Indiana 
established its board in 1881-but most were weak agencies with annual budgets of less 
than $5,000, whose primary function was to license physicians. On the bright side, by 
1910 the reporting of communicable diseases was compulsory in most states. 19 
By the turn of the century most major cities had health departments. Their 
effectiveness and quality varied, but nearly all were headed by a physician and included 
health professionals such as bacteriologists, chemists, sanitary engineers, statisticians, 
and various inspectors on their staffs. During the early years of the twentieth century, 
municipal health departments expanded rapidly, with specialized divisions for conta-
gious diseases, food inspection, water purity, and so on replacing the original handful 
f . d. 'd I. 20 o m IVI ua mspectors. 
On the national level, the U.S. Marine Hospital Service slowly expanded its 
authority during the 1890s, moving into Cuba and Hawaii when they came under 
American influence. The Service's highly effective work with yellow fever in Cuba and 
bubonic plague resulted in legislation in 1902 that reorganized it and renamed it the 
U.S. Public Health and Marine Hospital Service. The same law contained a provision 
that state and territorial health officers meet annually with the surgeon general, thus 
legitimizing the supremacy of the federal government in public health affairs. Rupert 
Blue, an official of the Service who was later to become U.S. Surgeon General, brought 
under control an outbreak of bubonic plague in San Francisco right after its cata-
strophic earthquake in 1906. In 1912 Congress changed the agency's name to the U.S. 
Public Health Service (USPHS) and extended its powers. World War I greatly broad-
13 
ened its powers as the Service took on the problems of controlling venereal disease 
among American soldiers and sailors and resource mobilization during the Great 
Pandemic of 1918. 21 
Public Health and Sanitation in Indianapolis: The Indianapolis 
Health Department 
Indianapolis had a health department as early as 1859, created to deal with 
malaria and other epidemics that the city had had to contend with from its founding. 
In 1848 the city council gained the authority to levy a tax to raise funds for smallpox 
v~ccinations and to build a smallpox hospital, but as t~e disease subsided, resistance to 
the tax grew and the plan fell through. 22 
The Indianapolis Health Department was responsible for prevention and con-
trol of disease, and within four years of its founding, had set standards and established 
sanitary regulations for slaughterhouses, food markets, and food inspection. In addi-
tion, there were city ordinances governing the keeping of cows, hogs, and the disposal 
of dead and diseased animals. In 1871 all hotels, restaurants, boarding houses, saloons, 
hospitals, and infirmaries were required by law to connect to the newly constructed city 
sewer system, thereby eliminating the need for large cesspools and privy vaults. 
In 1875 the Indianapolis Health Department gained the authority to condemn 
and confiscate unfit food and in 1889 began regulating the quality of milk and butter in 
the city. By 1893 its authority extended to the inspection of wells and the condemnation 
of those unfit for use. In 1904 the city's health department gained the authority to 
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inspect hotels, restaurants, breweries, and distilleries, and to enforce sanitary regula-
tions governing their operation. Two years later, regulation of the control and disposal 
of garbage also came under the department's oversight. The cumulative effect of these 
regulations, however, did little to abate the continual bacterial infections, tuberculosis, 
and venereal diseases that were rampant in the city in the early years of the twentieth 
century. 
In 1905 state legislation established the Indianapolis Board of Health and 
Charities, providing for a full-time city health officer who would also serve as full-time 
superintendent of the city hospital and dispensary (now Wishard Memorial Hospital 
and its clinics). In 1912 Dr. Herman G. Morgan was appointed to this position, which 
he held until his death in 1946. During his thirty-three years as Indianapolis' health 
officer, Morgan devoted considerable effort to lowering the pneumonia death rate and 
infant mortality rate. He also fought for numerous public health measures, most 
notably pure food regulations and construction of the city sewage disposal plant. 
Morgan remained in office through eight city administrations, his dedication and the 
high quality of his work transcending any partisan considerations. 23 
Another vital component of the public health system in Indianapolis during the 
pandemic was public health nursing. The Flower Mission was the first organization to 
provide this service to residents in 1879. The Mission had originally been formed by 
some of the city's affluent women who sought to cheer homebound patients with flowers 
and friendly conversation. They quickly perceived that the needs of those they visited 
went much deeper and began working instead to provide them with material assistance, 
15 
later expanding the Mission's services to include members of patients' families as well. 
In 1902 the Flower Mission completed a hospital for patients with incurable tubercu-
losis and cancer. After studying the needs of families reporting to the city dispensary, 
the organization's leaders concluded that there was a need for nurses who could go into 
poor patients' homes and teach family members to care for them. This program led in 
turn to recognition of the general need for nurses in the community, and the Mission 
took on this project as well. It expanded so much that it was incorporated as a separate 
organization, the Public Health Nursing Association. In 1947 its name was changed to 
Visiting Nurses Association of Indianapolis, and the name Public Health Nurses was 
used to refer to nurses employed by the city health department. 24 
Public Health and Sanitation in Indiana: The Indiana State Board of 
Health 
In 1878 the Indiana Medical Association, unable to convince state legislators of 
the need for a state board of health, formed the State Health Commission, a committee 
that was to collect and encourage the recording of vital statistics, which was a long-
standing goal of the Association. In 1881 the state legislature passed a bill creating the 
State Board of Health and allowing an annual appropriation of $5,000 for its budget. 
The board was charged, in part, with the responsibility to collect and "study the vital 
statistics of this State and endeavor to make intelligent and profitable use of the 
collected records of deaths and of sickness among the people [and] make sanitary 
investigations and inquiries respecting the causes of disease and especially of epidemics." 25 
16 
The board's first actions were to organize health boards in communities through 
the state that had none, and to arrange for the routine collection of vital statistics. In 
the absence of legislation requiring the registration of births and deaths, the latter 
innovation was routinely ignored. The public and even many physicians did not 
understand the concept of a health board and its functions, nor the need to register the 
cause of death. Indiana also lacked a medical practice law, a requirement for physicians 
to be registered and to have passed some sort of examination or to present proof of 
adequate qualifications before being allowed to practice in the state. The board 
functioned for a time as a crude register, having listed the names of the medical schools 
they considered competent to train physicians, until passage of the Medical Registra-
tion law in 1897. 26 .. 
John N. Hurty became secretary ofthe State Board of Health in 1896. An Ohio 
native, Hurty had come to Indianapolis as a pharmacist associated with the Eli Lilly 
Company. He received his M.D. degree from the Medical College of Indiana in 
Indianapolis and joined its faculty after graduation, where he served as professor of 
medicine throughout his career. He became famous as "the Hoosier health officer" 
during his twenty-six-year tenure at the board. A zealous and indefatigable crusader 
for the expansion and improvement of public health programs, Hurty wrote a book-
length plea on the subject, Life with Health, as well as numerous articles on health and 
hygiene. Hurty was a highly respected health professional whose dedication and 
progressive ideas attracted many adherents. He was noted for his directness, acerbic 
wit, and impatience with what he perceived to be stingy and backward state legislators 
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who refused for a decade to pass legislation that would allow cities and counties to 
establish full-time health departments. In fact, after the influenza pandemic was over, 
Hurty claimed that the number of deaths could have been halved if Indiana had had 
"efficient all-time health officers." 27 
Medical Science and the Medical Profession in 1918 
Throughout the course of the epidemic, health officials at all levels relied heavily 
on statistics-counts of flu and pneumonia cases and flu and pneumonia deaths-in 
gauging the strength of the epidemic and determining what course of action to take. 
The validity of these statistics depended on conscientious reporting by physicians and 
health officers, but the requirement for making regular reports was a relatively new and 
not particularly popular one, especially among some older physicians. The Indiana 
General Assembly had amended the health Jaw in 1899 to provide for the reporting by 
each county of births, marriages, and contagious diseases on a quarterly basis, and 
deaths on a monthly basis to the state board; death certificates and burial permits were 
also to be issued. 28 
Hurty worked diligently to enforce this statute, and began publishing the State 
Board of Health's Bulletin on a monthly basis to inform the people of Indiana of their 
state's health and vital statistics. As a result of the passage of this law in 1899, Indiana 
joined Michigan, the New England states, New Jersey, and New York in the Bureau of 
the Census' Original Death Registration Area. This was something of an honor and 
one not shared by Illinois or Ohio, which had as yet made no provision for the collection 
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of mortality statistics on a statewide basis. The registration area changed from year to 
year until 1933 when it came to encompass the entire United States. 
Many physicians saw lit~le reason to determine with any degree of accuracy what 
their patients had died from, and even less reason to complete the paperwork to report 
it, when they could be treating patients who were still living. The notion of prevention 
and the role played by health statistics were still new at this time and were not congruent 
with the more traditional ideas of healing that were still prevalent in many places. The 
medical profession in the early years of the twentieth century was still in the throes of 
a series of changes that had rocked the intellectual world with some regularity since the 
inception of the scientific revolution. 
The traditional, metaphorical way of looking at "the human body, which had 
prevailed for centuries, had been replaced in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
by an empirical one based on scientific observation and experimentation. The body 
had been viewed as a system of intake and outgo that had to remain in equilibrium if 
health was to be maintained. Thus, traditionalists emphasized diet and excretion, 
perspiration and ventilation. Bleeding and purging were used as means of adjusting 
the body to seasonal changes, and people routinely resorted to cathartics in order to 
make sure their bodies remained in equilibrium. Furthermore, medical theory related 
local to systemic ills, described every part of the body as related to every other, and 
presented health or disease as general states of the total organism. For example, a 
distracted mind could curdle the stomach, or a dyspeptic stomach could produce mental 
19 
agitation. A lesion might reflect imbalances of nutrients in the blood and might in turn 
. "11 29 cause systemrc 1 s. 
Prior to the ascendancy of the germ theory of disease, physicians did not believe 
that specific agents caused illness, nor did they perceive diseases as having a specific 
cause or going through routinely identifiable stages in the infected organism. In fact, 
early nineteenth-century hospital records often failed to record a diagnosis because 
disease was seen as a general state of the human body in relation to its environment, 
not as a response to a particular agent that would be shared by anyone else afflicted 
with the same illness. Physicians were expected to draw blood, make the patient 
perspire, urinate, or defecate-in short, to do something that would seem to restore 
the body's equilibrium. They could not easily accept the iaea that a specific agent could 
cause disease or that a specific substance could cure it. Quacks had been peddling 
specific-and useless-cures for centuries, so physicians found the discoveries and 
claims of the adherents of the germ theory preposterous and scandalously reminiscent 
of those put forward by such fakirs. 
Changes in medicine in antebellum America were inspired largely by develop-
ments in the Paris Clinical School. The French school was in the medical avant-garde 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, having radically departed from traditional 
views of medicine and the human body. Its proponents saw diseases as specific entities 
with predictable courses and symptoms that could often be linked with some abnormal 
physiological manifestation at autopsy. Hence, the autopsy room began to take prece-
dence over the library in medical training, and the data of the senses, aided by 
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stethoscope and scalpel, eclipsed rationalistic theorizing when dealing with disease and 
. t t 30 1ts trea men . 
By the time of the Spanish flu epidemic, the practice of medicine had for the 
most part assumed a fairly modern face. The training received by the average practi-
tioner had begun to resemble much more closely that of his counterpart in the second 
half of the twentieth century and less that of a barber or a mechanic. Although the 
Council on Medical Education of the American Medical Association as late as 1906 
still recommended only one year of college for medical school admission, this same 
period saw a persistent upgrading of the formal medical curriculum. By the end of the 
1890s, the teaching of basic science was no longer the domain of practicing physicians-
men with no formal training in science per se-and was being taken over by nonmedical 
doctorates. (This was not the case at all medical schools, however; as noted earlier, 
Hurty joined the teaching staff of the Indiana Medical College as professor of medicine 
after his graduation from that institution, although his previous training had consisted 
solely of a pharmacy course.) The thirteen-week ungraded clinical teaching term had 
been gradually extended to six-months, and by 1910, practically all medical schools 
offered four years of graded instruction. 31 
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CHAPTER 2: 
Spanish Influenza in the United States 
Development of the Spanish Influenza Pandemic 
The exact point of origin of the Spanish flu pandemic will never be known, but 
the first wave seems to have begun simultaneously in the United States and the Far 
East. Localized outbreaks of influenza occurred in March 1918 in some American 
military camps and may have been carried from there to France by troops joining the 
American Expeditionary Force. It spread to Spain at the end of April and developed 
in England in June, where it was christened "Spanish flu." Influenza also appeared in 
March in the Japanese Navy and in China where it became widespread by May. 1 It 
had disappeared from the United States and Canada by the end of April, but swept 
across Europe, North Africa, and India in the spring and summer. It struck New 
Zealand, the Philippines, and Hawaii by the end of July, thus completely circling the 
globe in less than five months. The New World was almost entirely untouched by the 
first wave; except for early eruptions in the United States and Central America, North 
and South America had remained free of influenza. 2 
The mild spring wave was not as deadly as the second wave, but observers later 
noted that this initial round of influenza had been unusual in two respects. First, 
although there had been few pneumonic complications and deaths associated with the 
flu outbreak, an unusually large number of those who had died were young adults. Also, 
the pneumonia cases that did develop involved hemorrhagic and edematous processes 
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not normally occurring in this disease.3 These disturbing characteristics were to emerge 
full-blown in the autumn, making the ensuing pandemic particularly fearsome and 
destructive. 
Despite its relative mildness, influenza in the spring and summer infected 
extremely large numbers of people. Spain, for example, may have earned its epony-
mous distinction because as a nonbelligerent nation it had no wartime censorship to 
keep secret from the world the eight million cases that developed there during May and 
June. Switzerland, another noncombatant nation, suffered 53,000 cases in July alone. 
So many thousands of soldiers on both sides of the Western Front were stricken that 
the war effort was temporarily disrupted; flu forced the British to postpone their attack 
against La Becque in late June, stalled the American EXpeditionary Force's only full 
scale drive of the war, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, and was given partial blame by 
General Eric von Ludendorff for halting Germany's last victory drive in July. 4 
The development of new subtypes or variants of influenza and their dissemina-
tion were greatly facilitated in 1918 by the movement of large numbers of soldiers from 
all parts of the world, as well as laborers from China and elsewhere being brought 
together in Europe. Many of those people were of the ages that proved to be especially 
susceptible to Spanish influenza; they were often poorly sheltered, and subjected to 
extremely crowded living conditions. 5 This combination of circumstances apparently 
gave rise somehow to a second and much more virulent wave of influenza that began 
in August in Ashkhabad in southern Russia; Freetown, Sierra Leone; Brest, France; 
and Boston. How and where it originated will never be known with certainty, but it is 
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possible that the second wave was caused by a mutation of the first wave's flu virus after 
it had passed through millions of hosts, or equally possibly, it may have been a 
completely new flu virus. 6 Whatever its origin, the " new" virus was on the attack and 
the stage was set for epidemiological disaster on a grand scale. 
The Spread of the Epidemic in Military Camps and the Country as a 
Whole 
When the second and most severe wave of Spanish influenza struck the United 
States in September 1918, American authorities, like their counterparts in Europe and 
elsewhere, were ill-prepared to combat this rapidly spreading disease. Some news of 
.. 
the influenza epidemic that had swept across Europe in the summer had filtered 
through to America past wartime censors, but not enough to fully convey its gravity. 
What news had gotten through, however, caused the U.S. Public Health Service 
(USPHS) sufficient concern that on August 16 it instructed quarantine officers in port 
cities to be on the alert for influenza on vessels coming from Europe. The USPHS 
ordered them to detain any infection-bearing ships until local health authorities could 
be notified. (The USPHS did not have the authority to quarantine common, mild 
illnesses such as flu, which at the time was not a reportable disease for most health 
departments.) Given the nature of influenza and its ease of transmission, quarantine 
to be truly useful would have had to be total, an impossibility at so crucial a juncture in 
the war, even if the USPHS had had the authority to take this step. 7 
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Health authorities at Boston, New York, and other ports on the East Coast were 
already concerned about influenza and were fumigating ships arriving from Spain. 
After August 12, however, when a Norwegian liner docked at Brooklyn with one 
hundred passengers ill wjth influenza, all foreign ships entering the port were fumi-
gated. This was a futile measure because influenza had been reported on American 
naval vessels at a number of ports around the world. The navy would bear the brunt 
of the first onslaught of the epidemic; within a short time flu cases appeared among 
sailors at eastern ports as far south as Florida. 8 
On August 27 influenza struck sailors at Boston's Commonwealth Pier and 
promptly spread to the First Naval District where 2,000 men were soon infected. On 
September 3 the first civilian victim of influenza was admttted to Boston City Hospital, 
on September 4 flu had cropped up at Harvard's Navy Radio School in Cambridge, and 
on September 8 the first flu case appeared at Camp Devens, near Ayer, in eastern 
Massachusetts. Authorities quarantined the 41,000 men there, 5,000 of whom devel-
oped influenza. 9 
By September 11 flu had developed among navy personnel in Rhode Island, 
New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, Florida, and 
Illinois. The army had more than 9,000 cases of flu by September 20 and 20,000 cases 
three days later, having continued to move troops in spite of the Surgeon General's 
order that men who had been exposed to influenza or who had fallen ill with it should 
not be transferred from one camp to another. 10 
25 
At the same time that the flu pandemic was picking up speed in the United 
States, the American Expeditionary Force was launching the Meuse-Argonne offen-
sive. Public attention was riveted on the massive effort that aimed to topple the hated 
Kaiser and end Europe's four-year-long nightmare, so news of the 50,000 flu cases that 
had broken out among civilians in Massachusetts was largely unheeded. 
The US PHS had been created to deal with just such an emergency as the Great 
Pandemic of 1918, but the Service was still untried and the same was true of the 
thousands of city and county health departments throughout the country. In theory if 
a national health crisis arose, the component parts would function as a system; in 
actuality the planning and organization that would allow them to do so was absent and 
would be only partially created on an ad hoc basis during the course of the pandemic. 
Another handicap with which health authorities had to deal was the war itself. 
Not only had it been responsible in large part for the spread of the first wave of the 
pandemic throughout the world, but it had also exacerbated the situation within the 
United States by moving thousands of young men around the country. This massive 
movement brought immunologically unexposed youth from small towns and rural areas 
to overcrowded army and naval training camps that were about to become veritable 
pesthouses. Further, the unlimited and relentless demands of the war effort monop-
olized the nation's energy and resources, diverting official attention from the looming 
health crisis. Even the speedy and unanimous approval by Congress on September 26 
of a $1 million appropriation to fight the flu was motivated in considerable part by 
concern that the epidemic would knock out industrial and munitions manufacture and 
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thus impede the war effort. 11 This was a realistic concern; by the following week, there 
were 2,000 flu cases among shipyard workers in New England and the North Atlantic 
states, a figure that represented 10 percent of the workforce there. Unchecked, the 
epidemic could have crippled the nation's shipbuilding capacity at a critical time. 12 
One million dollars was a very large sum of money in 1918-fully a third of the 
entire USPHS budget for the year-but it was only a fraction of the estimated $6 billion 
needed to defeat Germany. The Argonne offensive was rapidly draining American 
coffers, and on October 4, regardless of the advance of Spanish influenza on the 
domestic front, the federal government launched its Fourth Liberty Loan drive to raise 
this sum. The drive would entail thousands of contagion-spreading meetings, rallies, 
and door-to-door solicitations, but the need to win the war outweighed this consider-
ation. Officials in cities and towns all over the country would follow similarly conflicting 
courses of action-on the one hand, fighting desperately to suppress the epidemic, yet 
on the other, opening a breach in their epidemiological defenses by allowing the loan 
drive to take place. 13 
Yet if military considerations often took precedence over the welfare of civilians 
during the pandemic, army and navy personnel were struck sooner and more severely 
by the pandemic than the civilian population. Spanish influenza peaked among navy 
personnel on shore duty in the United States in the last week of September, among 
army personnel during the week ending October 11, and two weeks later in the civilian 
population in the eastern part of the country. Frequently the first news of influenza in 
a city's newspapers referred to military camps and their personnel. (This was certainly 
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true in Indianapolis, where the first reference to Spanish influenza in the newspaper 
described its progress among sailors of the First Naval District in Boston.) 14 
Because the armed services were in the vanguard of the epidemic, they were to 
a considerable extent the foci from which the disease emanated to the civilian popula-
tion. The navy reduced travel between stations in accordance with the Surgeon 
General's order, but that did not prevent sailors from carrying the disease home with 
them on furlough to all parts of the country or to other seaports and training detach-
ments. Influenza first appeared on September 11 at Great Lakes Naval Training 
Station, thirty miles north of Chicago, three days later reached that city's northern 
suburbs, nearest the station, and rapidly progressed south. (Influenza was brought to 
Peru, one of the first cities in Indiana to report the disea~e, by a young sailor home on 
furlough from Great Lakes.) Similarly, influenza became epidemic in Seattle on 
September 25, well before other cities in the Pacific region, because infected sailors 
from the Philadelphia Naval Yard had brought the disease to Puget Sound Naval Yard 
on September 11. 15 
This is not to suggest that military personnel were the only disseminators of 
influenza. The disease's short incubation period and sudden onset made merchant 
seamen, railroadmen, and other travelers unwitting carriers, but soldiers were quite 
numerous and traveled to and from virtually every community in the country. Also, the 
transmission of influenza was facilitated by the army's policy of cramming troops being 
transported so closely together on trains that mass infection was assured even if only a 
few men had been exposed to the virus. However, in a belated attempt to stop the 
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spread of influenza, the War Department halted this practice in early October, reduced 
troop shipments to France by 10 percent, and ordered a reduction in the intensity of 
training at all army camps. 
Unfortunately, the War Department's action was too little and too late; prompt 
action on the part of army leaders at an earlier point might have damped the epidemic 
in the camps, but by the time Provost Marshal Crowder cancelled draft calls scheduled 
for October 7 and October 11, there were already 35,000 cases of influenza in army 
camps. New cases were developing at the rate of 6,000 and 7,000 a day, and only 13 
camps had not yet reported flu. 16 The death rate in the camps before the epidemic 
began had been 4.4 per thousand but swiftly rose to 32.4 per thousand as flu and 
pneumonia took their toll. By mid-October the number" of new cases in army camps 
was declining, but the epidemic did not completely burn itself out until a month later. 17 
The Indianapolis newspapers published items almost solely about the camps 
nearest Indiana: Camp Grant in Rockford, Illinois; Great Lakes Naval Training Station 
north of Chicago; Camp Sherman in Chillicothe, Ohio; and Camp Taylor near Louis-
ville, where most of the draftees from Indiana reported in 1917. 18 The situation in 
these camps was very serious during the epidemic, with obituaries of the many men 
from Indiana who had died there appearing in the Indianapolis newspapers on a daily 
basis. As of October 10, over 6,000 of the 36,000 men stationed at Camp Sherman had 
had flu. One third of those infected developed pneumonia, which had a death rate of 
40 percent. Camp Taylor had had over 11,000 flu cases by October 17, and Camps 
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Grant and Sherman had lost over 1,000 men each to flu and pneumonia by the month's 
19 
end. 
In the country as a whole, flu spread from the Northeast to the South, the 
Midwest, and the West Coast, peaking in the eastern states several weeks before it did 
in the West. 20 Information coming to the USPHS on October 3 showed influenza 
rapidly spreading among civilians nationwide, having appeared in forty-three states. It 
was epidemic in New England, tidewater Virginia, South Carolina, and other places, 
and was prevalent along the Atlantic seaboard and the Gulf Coast. By October 5, the 
USPHS announced that influenza was epidemic in New Jersey, parts of Pennsylvania, 
Maine, Delaware, all of Virginia, and Alabama. By October 8 flu had spread through-
out the South and eight days later was epidemic in pra~tically every state, with only 
Massachusetts showing any improvement. Conditions were serious in most of the 
coastal states from Maine to Florida; cases were increasing in Washington, Oregon, 
and California, and in Chicago, which had a full closing ban in effect. 21 
Swollen by thousands of war workers, the population of Washington, D.C., 
proved especially susceptible to the epidemic as a housing shortage forced new arrivals 
to live in extremely overcrowded conditions. According to the Star, officials in Wash-
ington were taking extraordinary precautions to protect from influenza employees of 
government bureaus vital to the war effort. They ordered all galleries of Congress 
closed, except for press galleries, and barred all visitors other than attorneys from the 
chambers of the Supreme Court. Government officials even considered curtailing the 
steady influx of war workers into the city until the worst of the epidemic passed; there 
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New Influenza/Pneumonia Cases 
Indianapolis- October-December 1918 
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TABLE2 
Influenza and Pneumonia Deaths 
Indianapolis, October-December 1918 
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were no empty hospital beds anywhere in Washington, and influenza was spreading 
unchecked in boarding houses where three and four people shared a single room. A 
week later the Departments of the Treasury and the Interior issued orders that no new 
employees would be brought to the city until further notice; other government agencies, 
expanding rapidly because of the war, and still in need of clerical help, were expected 
to follow suit. 22 
By October 20, the pandemic was loosening its grip on the eastern part of the 
country, but was still strong elsewhere. Conditions had improved in the Midwest by the 
end of the month, but the crest of the epidemic did not strike the West until a week or 
so later. Even then the crisis was not over as influenza returned to the South, Midwest, 
and the far West in a second wave of equal severity to the first. The East did not 
experience the second wave, although there were exceptions, especially Massachusetts 
whose health authorities warned other regions of the disease's dangerous recurrence. 23 
The Spread of Influenza in Indianapolis 
The first cases of Spanish influenza among civilians in Marion County occurred 
in September 1918 at a camp of laborers who worked for a construction company in 
Beech Grove. Indianapolis Health Department officials suspected that there were 
another 25 cases among the civilian population, but could not confirm this. (Mayor 
Charles W. Jewett was among the early cases, but he soon recovered.) By Saturday, 
October 5, the n':lmber of cases had jumped to 123, and 78 more cases were reported 
Sunday. By Monday, October 7, the civilian death toll from influenza and pneumonia 
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had reached 20, and a total of 48 soldiers and military trainees had died. By the end 
of the first 7 days of October, 507 cases of influenza had developed among civilians and 
2,171 among military personnel. (Table 1 shows the weekly incidence of new cases of 
influenza among the civilian population and among military personnel respectively for 
the period October 1, 1918, through December 31. Table 2 shows the weekly incidence 
of influenza and pneumonia deaths for both groups during the same time.) 24 
According to reports of the Indianapolis Health Department that the Star and 
News published, there were 11,465 cases of influenza in the city during the last three 
months of 1918. In that 3-month period, the epidemic advanced and retreated in 3 
cycles. Among the civilian population of Indianapolis, Spanish influenza spread at a 
rapid rate from October 10 through the end of the month. It reached official epidemic 
stage on October 11 when the total number of cases exceeded 5 per 1,000 population. 25 
Once the flu had gained momentum, the number of new cases reported daily was fairly 
high, 200 on 10 separate days in October. The number of deaths was correspondingly 
high: There were 53 deaths on October 22 and 45 on October 25, but most of the time 
the daily mortality figure hovered in the teens and twenties. 
November showed signs of improvement. For the first 8 days of the month, the 
number of new cases was significantly lower than in October-well below 100 per day, 
with the exception of November 3 when 121 new cases appeared. Deaths were lower 
too, 10 or fewer per day except for November 6 when 30 people died from flu and 
pneumonia. The epidemic flared up again, however, after the crowded celebrations of 
the false and actual Armistice days; 100 new cases were reported on November 12 and 
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again on the 15th. Thereafter, new cases returned to the higher levels seen in October 
and stayed there until November 26. The number of deaths did not follow suit and 
hovered in the teens. Between November 27 and December 3, new cases were below 
100 per day, but rose again in a third, weaker resurgence of influenza during mid-De-
cember. During this third wave, the number of deaths per day remained in the lower 
teens. From December 18 on, the number of new cases declined slowly and reached 
near-normal levels by the first week in January. On January 5 for the first time since 
early October, no deaths from influenza or pneumonia were reported to the city health 
board. 26 
There were 34 influenza and pneumonia deaths in Indianapolis in September, 
430 in October, 303 in November, and 247 in December. Between September 1 and 
December 31, 1918, out of a population of 289,577, 1,014 people died in the pandemic. 
This number represents a case mortality of 8.8 percent; this means that 8.8 percent of 
the 11,465 cases of flu reported to the city health department ended fatally. Spanish 
influenza typically killed no more than 2 or 3 percent of those it infected, so 8.8 percent 
seems rather high. It is more probable that flu cases in Indianapolis were underre-
ported, as they were elsewhere in the state. There is no way to know for certain how 
many cases of flu there actually were in Indianapolis, but it is possible to make a 
reasonably good guess. In 1919, the U.S. Public Health Service conducted a house-to-
house survey of eleven cities and towns across the country to determine what proportion 
of the population had contracted flu during the pandemic. The results showed that 280 
out of every 1,000 persons had been ill with flu. Based on this ratio, an estimated 28 
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percent of the population of Indianapolis-or 81,081 people-might have had flu. 
Using this number rather than that officially reported to the health department gives 
a percentage of fatal cases-1.25-much more in line with the 2-3 percent normally 
associated with Spanish flu . In other words, for every flu case reported, seven may have 
gone unreported. Given the highly contagious nature of the disease, it is not impossible 
to believe that 81,000 people contracted it during the winter of 1918-19. As far as 
underreporting of cases is concerned, during the pandemic, officials of the State Board 
of Health frequently voiced their suspicions that they were being notified of only a 
fraction of flu cases. Doctors were simply too busy fighting Spanish flu to keep up with 
their paperwork, and there is no reason to believe that doctors in Indianapolis were an 
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exception. 
The Spread of Influenza at Indianapolis Military Camps 
As in many other cities in the U.S., the first visitation of Spanish influenza in 
Indianapolis occurred at a military facility. Indianapolis had a large army post, Fort 
Benjamin Harrison, nine miles northeast of the city, and three army vocational detach-
ments in its midst. Vocational Detachment No.1 was quartered at the Metropole Hotel 
in the city's downtown, Detachment No. 2 at the Indiana School for the Deaf on the 
city's northside, and Detachment No.3 at Arsenal Technical High School, a mile east 
of Monument Circle. Indianapolis was also home to an aviation depot at Speedway, 
and a Student Army Training Corps (S.A.T.C.) unit at Butler College in Irvington, a 
suburb five miles east of the city. 28 
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Newly constructed in 1906, Fort Harrison had been selected as one of a series 
of key mobilization and training sites for specialty functions critical to the overall war 
effort, and as a result continuously housed large numbers of soldiers. 29 In August the 
War Department changed the Fort's function to that of a hospital for sick and wounded, 
and on September 21, 1918, General Hospital No. 25, as it was designated, began 
receiving the first casualties. Just 6 days later 60 mild cases of influenza had cropped 
up at the Fort. 30 
When the number of cases grew to 200 within a 2-day period, the Fort's medical 
officer placed the post under quarantine. By October 6 there were 1,100 cases of flu 
and 128 cases of pneumonia, an onslaught of disease that overwhelmed the Fort's 
hospital and its personnel, who were attempting to care for 1,600 patients in a 300-bed 
facility. The Red Cross committee appealed to the Indianapolis community on the 
Fort's behalf for nurses, who were desperately needed to staff the wards, and for 
pajamas, nightshirts, and bed linens for patients with the flu. 31 
Influenza's initial appearance among the vocational detachments was reported 
on September 28; 150 cases had developed at the Deaf School, which was placed under 
quarantine by commandant Major J. Dalbey Crawfis. Authorities believed that 3 or 4 
cases had developed at the Metropole Hotel, but none had surfaced yet at Tech. 32 
Within two days, however, the situation had changed drastically. There were 93 cases 
at the Metropole, 523 at the Deaf School, and 30 at Tech, causing superintendent of 
schools, E.C. Graff, to postpone the opening of the fall semester at the high school. 
The Deaf School had originally been intended to house all the soldiers in the vocational 
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detachments, but first a new building had to be constructed there to accommodate 
them. In the meantime, 500 soldier trainees were staying in the Metropole Hotel and 
50 were at Tech. Construction came to a halt when 104 out of the 150 carpenters at 
work on the project were felled by influenza. The new building was not completed and 
ready for use until October 21 when the soldiers at Tech and at the Metropole were 
transferred to the Deaf School. On October 6 the first flu cases appeared at the Butler 
S.A.T.C. unit when seventeen men were reported ill. By the next day the number had 
jumped to forty-five and an emergency hospital for Butler students was established in 
Irvington. 33 Influenza continued to claim victims at the Fort, the vocational detach-
ments, and the S.A.T.C. unit through the next 2 weeks, but had subsided by the end of 
the month. There was a total of 3,089 cases of flu and pneumonia at Fort Harrison and 
182 deaths; the detachments had suffered over 700 cases and 45 deaths; the Speedway 
depot had had 18 cases and 2 deaths; and Butler had had 35 cases but no deaths. 34 
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CHAPTER3: 
Official Responses to the Pandemic 
Indianapolis' Response to the Crisis 
The Spanish influenza pandemic caught health and government officials every-
where off guard, and those in Indianapolis were no exception. In September 1918, 
before Spanish influenza appeared in Indiana, health officials knew that the Northeast 
was struggling with a deadly pandemic that severely strained their capacity to deal with 
it. Large numbers of people fell ill and required medical care at the same time, leading 
to a shortage of doctors, nurses, hospital beds, and medical supplies. Often entire 
families were rendered helpless by the flu, too ill to leave their beds to care for one 
another. Many of those afflicted were in the age group responsible for the maintenance 
of society. Doctors and nurses fell ill, as did police, firefighters, postal carriers, grave 
diggers, telephone operators, factory operatives, shipyard workers, soldiers and sailors, 
and numerous other essential members of the workforce. 
Knowing what was happening in Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City, it 
seems that local officials could have planned in advance for the mobilization and 
coordination of health resources, and alerted community leaders to the need for a 
contingency plan so that basic services would not be interrupted if the epidemic was 
severe. As it was, such planning was not started until the epidemic was well underway, 
and the crisis had begun to assume alarming proportions. 1 
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In Indianapolis, the patterns of response varied among groups according to their 
function and status and were sometimes altered in the course of the epidemic. The 
groups and organizations whose reactions to the pandemic will be analyzed here are 
the city and state boards of health, municipal officials, the American Red Cross, the 
business community, and the general public. The actions of the U.S. Surgeon General 
and the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) will also be discussed due to the 
salient role they played throughout the epidemic. 
In Indianapolis and much of the state, official responses to this public health 
threat focused on preventing the spread of influenza and allocation and coordination 
of resources. Preventive efforts, which began before the epidemic struck Indianapolis 
and continued for its duration, consisted of health education, stepped-up public sani-
tation efforts, a closing ban, and the enforced wearing of gauze masks in public. 
Resource mobilization, on the other hand, did not begin until influenza was widespread 
and there were simply not enough doctors, nurses, and hospital beds to accommodate 
the large numbers of people too debilitated by sickness to care for themselves. Nurses 
were at a premium as it quickly became apparent that in many cases their services were 
more instrumental than a physician's ministrations in bringing about a patient's recov-
ery. Consequently, nursing care was a resource of especially great value. 
As would be expected, health officials took the lead in combating the epidemic, 
while the role of city officials was primarily to implement the recommendations of the 
Indianapolis Health Department. The business community and the public for the most 
part complied with the health board's dictates, although not always cheerfully. This 
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pattern prevailed from September until mid-November when the closing ban was lifted 
in the city. At that time relations between the board of health and the rest of the 
community became strained, as various groups challenged official efforts to combat the 
resurging epidemic. State health officials publicly expressed their lack of confidence 
in the ability of local health officers to control the epidemic in their communities, and 
the Indianapolis newspapers began to report accounts of resistance on the part of the 
business community and the public to prevention efforts in many parts of the state. This 
was in marked contrast to the sense of cohesion that characterized the epidemic before 
the Armistice on November 11. 2 
While prevention measures were carried out in the public sector, resource 
mobilization and relief work occurred more in the private domain, primarily under the 
aegis of the American Red Cross and the Indiana branch of the American War Mothers. 
Charitable groups, such as the Flower Mission and churches performed relief work, but 
this was done as the need arose and not as part of any coordinated, larger-scale 
initiative. 
State and local health officials, as well as the U.S. Surgeon General and the 
US PHS, focused much of their energy on prevention, hoping to avert a national health 
catastrophe. Health education-disseminating information about Spanish influenza 
and related health matters-to the general public was the cornerstone of their preven-
tion efforts. Health officers tirelessly advised the public via pamphlets, newspapers, 
the telephone, and word of mouth regarding the dangers of Spanish influenza. They 
instructed people how to build resistance to influenza and what to do ifthe illness struck. 
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An obvious but unstated function of health advisories and daily updates on the number 
of new flu cases and deaths was to mobilize public opinion in support of action taken 
in the course of the epidemic by local boards of health. This support was needed to 
buttress the authority of the still-fledgling city and state boards in the face of opposition 
to closing bans and the wearing of flu masks. 
In the private sphere, people needed health information so they could act to 
protect themselves and their families. Action in the public sphere was required to limit 
the spread of infection by those who could not or would not protect themselves against 
illness, thereby threatening the general welfare. On the one hand, persons not yet 
experiencing influenza symptoms might unwittingly act as sources of infection. On the 
other hand, others who were unwilling to take to their beds at the first sign of illness, 
might heedlessly spread their germs abroad before the disease struck them down. The 
only way to limit the harm inflicted by both groups of carriers was to minimize 
opportunities for widespread personal contact. This meant prohibiting public gather-
ings such as church services, sporting events, meetings of voluntary associations, 
business conventions, balls, dances, and parties. Authorities closed schools, theaters, 
movie houses, and "dry" saloons, although they allowed restaurants, drug stores, and 
other retail establishments to remain open. 3 
This prohibition could not be absolutely enforced because workers still had to 
go to their jobs and people had to purchase food and other necessities. Doing these 
things required for many residents travel on crowded streetcars in a city that had grown 
too large to be traversed on foot. Health officials believed that people were especially 
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vulnerable to flu germs in enclosed spaces, so they requested that streetcars be operated 
with their windows open. Health officers strongly and repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of fresh air and proper ventilation, but streetcar conductors and some 
members of the public did not cooperate in keeping windows open. 4 
The value of wearing gauze masks in public to prevent the spread of influenza 
by droplet infection was often mentioned by Dr. Herman Morgan, head of the India-
napolis Health Department, but was not put into practice in Indianapolis until after the 
Armistice on November 11, 1918, when the closing ban had been lifted and the number 
of new cases and deaths began to climb again. This was a very unpopular measure, 
although many people did comply. 5 
Health Education and Spanish Influenza 
Before the pandemic began in earnest, U.S. Surgeon General Rupert Blue 
recognized that not only the public but also physicians themselves needed to be 
educated about influenza. In mid-September, after a telegraphic survey revealed that 
flu was springing up in a number of ports along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, he issued 
a special bulletin to the medical community describing the disease's symptoms, the way 
it was transmitted, and recommendations for its prevention and treatment. An earlier 
influenza pandemic had occurred in 1891-92, and since more than twenty-five years 
had passed, Dr. Blue expressed concern that many of the physicians practicing in 1918 
would be unprepared for the epidemiological onslaught that was almost certainly 
headed their way. 6 
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"The disease is characterized by sudden onset," Blue told the Associated Press. 
"People are stricken on the streets, while at work in factories, shipyards, offices or 
elsewhere. First there is a chill, then fever with temperature from 101 to 103; headache, 
backache, reddening and running of the eyes, pains and aches all over the body and 
general prostration." He advised persons so stricken to go to bed at once and call a 
physician. Treatment consisted principally of rest in bed, fresh air, abundant food, with 
Dover's powder for the relief of pain. "Every case with fever should be regarded as 
serious, and kept in bed at least until temperature becomes normal. Convalescence 
requires careful management to avoid serious complications, such as bronchial pneu-
monia, which not infrequently may have fatal termination. During the present outbreak 
in foreign countries the salts of quinine and aspirin have been most generally used 
during the acute attack." As to prevention, Blue judged quarantine unfeasible in the 
case of an influenza pandemic, relying instead on "intelligent action on the part of the 
public." 
Dr. Herman Morgan, head of the Indianapolis Health Department, began his 
educational efforts on September 24, before the first case of influenza had appeared 
in Indianapolis. He urged people to " take care of a cold because it might take on an 
increased virulency and cause pneumonia," to avoid exposure to colds and pneumonia, 
isolate pneumonia patients, and seek medical attention when pneumonia or a severe 
cold developed. Morgan advised the public that resistance to influenza required 
observing ordinary rules of good health, such as getting adequate rest, fresh air, and 
outdoor exercise, and eating a plain diet. He also recommended that people keep their 
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feet warm and dry, bathe regularly, and cover their noses and mouths with a handker-
chief when coughing or sneezing. 7 
In response to numerous requests for instructions on how to make masks for 
those nursing flu patients, Morgan issued a statement to the newspapers: the mask 
consisted of a piece of surgeon's gauze, folded in four or five layers into an oblong six 
to eight inches long, which was wide enough to cover the nostrils and mouth, and 
secured by string or elastic tape fastened to each corner and placed around the head. 8 
Morgan repeated similar advice several times during early October as the 
incidence of influenza rose to epidemic proportions. He exhorted the public to wear 
suitable, dry clothing, sleep in well-ventilated rooms, and avoid overeating. Above all, 
those with colds were to stay indoors and avoid crowds, both for the sake of their own 
health and that of others whom they might infect. Public sanitation was also essential; 
all places where people congregated were to be washed and kept clean. Morgan urged 
citizens to, "report all insanitary conditions and failures to ventilate buildings properly. 
Every citizen is a health officer in the efforts to prevent an epidemic of influenza." 9 
Morgan repeated the message to school nurses, providing them with a list of 
anti-flu axioms to pass along to teachers and school children. Persons with colds were 
to take proper care of themselves, he warned; trying to "wear a cold out" frequently 
brought on pneumonia. Influenza victims were to call a physician and go to bed and 
stay there until recuperation was complete. Pneumonia and its often fatal outcome 
were typically caused by convalescents' premature return to their normal activities 
without giving their heart muscles the opportunity to repair themselves. 10 
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In early October, Morgan, like health officials in other cities, requested the 
citizens of Indianapolis to refrain from burning leaves. The clouds of smoke so 
produced irritated the nose and throat, he explained, and should be avoided while the 
city faced an epidemic that spread through those organs. Later in the month as 
Halloween approached, Dr. John Hurty, secretary of the Indiana State Board of 
Health, expressed concern that "false faces" would become a means of spreading 
influenza germs and cautioned merchants not to allow customers with colds to try masks 
on before purchasing them. 11 
In mid-October, the State Board of Health printed and mailed to county health 
commissioners for distribution to the public circulars explaining how to identify and 
treat influenza, repeating the same advice that Morgan had given. Dr. John Hurty, 
secretary of the Indiana State Board of Health, urged people to rely on avoiding colds 
rather than taking the cold remedies that were on the market. Surgeon General Blue 
was also concerned about the so-called influenza "cures," both manufactured and 
home-made, that tempted the gullible with their claims. "The health service," he 
warned, "urges the public to remember that there is as yet no specific cure for influenza 
and that many of the alleged 'cures' and remedies now being recommended by neigh-
bors, nostrum vendors and others do more harm than good." 12 
Health officials repeatedly emphasized the importance of taking proper care of 
a cold or a case of influenza in order to avoid pneumonia. They wished to underscore 
the seriousness of influenza, but sometimes overstated their case. Several members of 
the State Board of Health declared that there was "little or no danger from flu if the 
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patient goes to bed at the first symptoms. The danger lies in pneumonia which follows 
an attempt to wear the disease out. " For example, Dr. W. D. Gatch, president of the 
board, said it was his belief that not more than one case in five hundred would be fatal 
if the patient went to bed at the first sign of flu. This advice ignored the fact that flu 
was characterized by sudden onset; often the first sign of infection was collapse, which 
obviously deprived the victim of an opportunity to "wear the disease out." 13 
The Closing Ban and the Masking Order: The Statewide Closing Ban 
On September 26, when Spanish influenza began cropping up all over the 
country, the State Board of Health instructed health officers throughout the state to 
impose closing bans in their communities as soon as influenza became epidemic locally; 
that is, when there were 5 to 10 'cases of influenza per 1,000 population. 14 
The statewide closing ban went into effect on October 9, 1918, and ended on 
November 2, 1918. The State Board of Health acted to issue a general closing order 
only after U.S. Surgeon General Blue sent telegrams to the state health boards on 
October 6 suggesting that they issue closing orders where the danger of an epidemic 
existed. Dr. William King, assistant secretary of the state board, immediately tele-
graphed all county health officers in Indiana to issue closing bans and directed physi-
cians in the state to report all influenza cases to city or county health officers, who were 
in turn to report them to the state board. 15 
King act~d without the formal authority of the State Board of Health when he 
unilaterally issued a general closing ban, but the board formally approved his action at 
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its next session on October 9 when it issued the most widespread closing order in its 
history. The board initially intended the ban to be in effect only through October 21 
but voted twice to extend it due to a strong resurgence of influenza in counties where 
the epidemic had appeared to be abating. The board officially ended the statewide ban 
at midnight on November 2, 1918. 16 
The state order, which was quite similar to that in effect in Indianapolis, 
prohibited all public gatherings in Indiana. That included schools of all types, reading 
rooms of public libraries, funerals, churches, and theaters and other places of public 
amusement. Local health officers could also close poolrooms, bowling alleys, clubs, 
and dry beer saloons if they saw fit. Court sessions were exempt from the ban, but 
judges were asked not to permit crowds in the courtrooms. Hurty encouraged local 
health officers to interpret the order more stringently if they saw fit, and ban any 
gathering they deemed a threat to public health, except for essential war activities of 
Red Cross units and conferences of Liberty Loan workers. 17 
Some stipulations of the closing ban applied to public transportation. Street-
cars, interurban cars, and railway passenger cars were to be thoroughly cleaned after 
each service trip and public conveyances were to leave their ventilators open in all 
weather. Their windows could be shut only during rainstorms or in temperatures below 
56 degrees. The order also prohibited public spitting as well as coughing and sneezing 
without holding a cloth or paper handkerchief over the nose and mouth. Anyone 
violating the closing order was subject to fines ranging from $5 to $50. 
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Physicians were to report promptly to the local health officer all cases of 
influenza coming under their care; city and town health officers were to report this 
information to county health commissioners, and they in turn, were to make a daily 
influenza report to the State Board of Health. 
The Closing Ban and the Masking Order: The Indianapolis Closing 
Ban 
During the epidemic, there were two separate bans in effect simultaneously in 
Indiana communities: The general closing order issued by the State Board of Health 
and concurrent bans issued by the local health officers. The chief health officer in a 
locality had the authority to order a closing ban before the state board issued one and 
make it more restrictive than the state ban. However, once the state ban was in place, 
he could not lift the ban he had issued without permission from the state board, nor 
could he make it less restrictive than the state ban. The Indianapolis Health Depart-
ment issued a closing order on October 7, 1918, and repealed it October 30, 1918, one 
day ahead of the rescinding of the statewide ban. 18 
On September 28, 1918, with the first cases of influenza having already broken 
out in the city, Morgan instructed theater managers to refuse admission to patrons 
suffering from coughs and colds and told school personnel to send home pupils who 
had symptoms of colds or flu. He expressed the hope that less drastic measures than 
issuing a closing ban could forestall a flu epidemic. Local theater managers, anxious to 
keep their businesses open, promised to cooperate fully. 19 
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In the belief that the Spanish influenza "germ" was more likely to thrive in dirty 
places, officials of the city health department turned their attention to public sanitation. 
Morgan had previously ordered that the owners and proprietors of all public places, 
such as theaters, railway stations, streetcars, and hotel lobbies to have them thoroughly 
cleaned. Now with an epidemic looming, he assigned inspectors to ride the streetcars 
to make sure that they were kept clean and that no one spit in them. Soon after, he 
ordered streetcars to be operated only with their windows open so that influenza would 
not be spread among the passengers. 20 
Mayor Charles W. Jewett showed his support of Morgan and the Indianapolis 
Health Department by directing the chief of police to enforce vigorously the city's 
anti-spitting ordinance. Jewett also ordered the fire department to flush the downtown 
streets, a completely ineffective prevention effort, but nonetheless one of the few 
municipal initiatives displayed during the epidemic. 21 
By October 7, as influenza began spreading rapidly through the civilian popu-
lation, Morgan instituted a strict closing order in the city. The ban, which prohibited 
all public gatherings of five or more persons, applied to theaters, motion picture houses, 
churches, city schools, parochial schools, business schools, colleges, and all meetings 
except those of Liberty Loan committees. Businesses and factories were not affected. 
Morgan discouraged people from visiting each other in their homes and warned that 
funerals should be attended only by relatives and close friends to lessen the spread of 
. f . 22 m ect10n. 
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The next day, he expanded the order to include poolrooms, bowling alleys, and 
skating rinks; dry beer saloons were allowed to remain open, but only if customers were 
prevented from congregating in them. The ban did not include court sessions, but 
Morgan recommended that courts adjourn during the epidemic, especially in cases that 
would require a jury to deliberate in the courthouse's cramped, unventilated jury 
room. 23 
Even though 1918 was a congressional election year, political rallies and meet-
ings were not exempted from the closing ban. Speakers scheduled for the week before 
the election had included such prominent figures as Warren G. Harding, Albert 
Beveridge, and Senators Harry New and James Watson, but local party leaders dutifully 
cancelled their engagements, forcing candidates to fall back on advertising instead of 
oratory to stimulate the voting public. 24 
The closing order quickly made apparent the social role played by the schools 
in keeping rowdy juveniles off the streets and out of trouble. As soon as the schools 
closed, the police began receiving complaints of business windows being soaped, fences 
torn down, and other property being destroyed. Authorities in some communities 
ordered children and youth to stay in their homes or at least in their own yards in order 
to avoid contagion, but Indianapolis officials did not resort to this restriction. Instead 
police patrolmen were ordered to disperse any crowds of boys found congregating on 
street corners and to arrest those carrying sling shots. 25 
On October 11, with indications that flu and pneumonia would reach epidemic 
stage in Indianapolis within the next few days, Morgan extended the closing ban again. 
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He promptly closed dry beer saloons after their proprietors had allowed crowds to 
congregate. He forbade hour bargain sales in department stores, warned the managers 
of 5-and-10-cent stores to disperse crowds of shoppers, and requested all store owners 
to make certain that elevators were not crowded and that employees with colds were 
sent home. 26 After meeting with representatives of the Merchants' Association the 
following day, Morgan expanded the closing ban by altering the opening and closing 
hours for downtown businesses. All retail stores, except drugstores and groceries, were 
to open at 9:45a.m. and close at 6:15p.m. in order to prevent crowding on streetcars. 27 
Members of the Indianapolis Church Federation complied with the closing ban 
by cancelling Sunday services. The Indianapolis Star sought to fill the spiritual void by 
publishing on Sundays a special feature called "Worship with the Star." It was "a 
complete program of religious exercises for home use," consisting of hymns, scripture 
lessons, prayers, and sermons by prominent Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious 
leaders. 28 
In view of the chilling effect the closing ban had on the commercial and social 
climate of the city, it is surprising that the order met with little resistance or complaint. 
The forced closings undoubtedly caused considerable hardship for small and marginal 
businesses; the closing of places of amusement meant people had less reason to go 
downtown, thereby reducing the volume of business at those establishments that 
remained open. Theater owners lost a great deal of money during the ban, and theater 
people-the traveling vaudevillians and actors in the touring stage productions that 
were public entertainment before the age of movies and radio-were especially eco-
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nomicallyvulnerable. Often low on money when they arrived in the city, and dependent 
on the engagement they were about to play for fare to their next destination, many were 
stranded wherever they happened to be when the closing ban fell. 29 
The newspapers reported little dissent, except for the owners of the dry beer 
saloons, who objected vehemently to being closed down while restaurants and soda 
parlors remained open. Morgan responded that the other establishments were well-
ventilated and that their patrons did not tend to congregate in them; by contrast, the 
atmosphere of saloons was "conducive to the transmission of disease germs" because 
men assembled there "to play cards and to loaf." 30 
The closing ban remained in place until October 30 when the Indianapolis 
Health Department voted, independently of the State Board of Health, to lift the ban 
on public gatherings effective the next morning. Hurty voiced a note of caution to 
officials in communities that had recently been severely affected by the epidemic; 
Massachusetts had advised other states not to follow its example and lift their bans too 
soon. People in Massachusetts had been anxious to lift the ban for "business reasons;" 
the consequent resurgence of influenza in some areas was "five times more fatal than 
the original." 31 
Schools reopened Monday, November 4, and business returned to normal with 
the exception that, as before the closing ban was instituted, people with coughs or colds 
were not to be admitted to theaters, and streetcar windows were to remain open. 
Downtown was usually thronged with merrymakers on Halloween, but Morgan urged 
the public to stay home even though the ban was lifted and continue to observe 
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precautions against catching influenza. Apparently people heeded his warnings, and 
the holiday passed with scant celebration. 32 
City health officials commented on the "splendid manner" in which people had 
complied with the closing order and credited most members of the business community 
for their spirit of cooperation. Like the saloons, the Indianapolis Traction and Termi-
nal Company was an exception. The company's owners voiced no complaints against 
the health department's actions, but its conductors were not keeping the streetcar 
windows open and were not heating the cars. Passengers reported these violations to 
the city health department, prompting Morgan to remind John Mahoney, superinten-
dent of the streetcar company, that ventilation was required. 
Morgan· predicted that there would be a temporary increase in the number of 
new cases of influenza because of the Armistice Day celebrations on Monday, Novem-
ber 11. Case numbers were indeed on the rise by Saturday and continued their upward 
trend Sunday and Monday. On November 19 the Indianapolis Health Department 
issued an order requiring the wearing of protective masks in public. They were to be 
worn by all citizens while in any store, office, factory, public building, theater, church, 
streetcar, or any public gathering place. Masks did not have to be worn in private 
homes, on the street, or while eating in public. Store employees were to wear masks 
while working, and patrons were to put their masks over their faces immediately upon 
entering a store. Barbers and dentists, waiters and food dispensers were to be masked, 
as were elevator operators and streetcar conductors. Actors, ministers, and public 
speakers could remove their masks while speaking, but were to replace them when 
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done. In order to discourage profiteering, health officials declared that a ready-made 
mask should cost no more than a dime, and the price of material for five or six masks 
should be about twenty-five cents. 33 
Later in the week, the city board of health ruled that people did not have to wear 
masks in well-ventilated places and where there were no crowds. The board also closed 
the public schools for an indefinite period of time and discouraged all public meetings 
that were not of vital importance. John Loucks, chief of the fire department, sent 
notices to all fire engine houses instructing that the loafing of outsiders at the engine 
houses should be discouraged. The public library and its branches were closed too, 
primarily because staff attrition due to illness precluded enforcement of the masking 
order among patrons. No business establishment would be closed unless its operators 
permitted violations of the masking order, Morgan said. The city health department 
had considered reinstituting the closing ban, but decided against it because of the 
disastrous consequences it would have for business during the Christmas shopping 
season. 34 
The Indianapolis Health Department decided to close the elementary schools 
because officials thought it would be difficult to keep masks on young children. 
Although high school students would probably have cooperated in wearing masks, the 
board decided to close secondary schools as well due to the belief of medical authorities 
at that point in the epidemic that adolescents were especially susceptible to influenza. 
Overall, schools were closed by influenza longer than any other type of facility. They 
had not been closed due to an epidemic since a diphtheria outbreak in 1910, but in 1918 
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lost virtually the entire fall term. School officials ultimately resigned themselves to the 
closings but were concerned about how to make up so much instructional time. Herbert 
Foltz, president of the Indianapolis Board of School Commissioners, feared that some 
high school students, especially those attending Tech, might not return, "having found 
employment at good wages." It appears, however, that school closings were a prudent 
move; during the statewide resurgence of influenza, the state board found that children 
were affected to a greater extent than in the October outbreak when they represented 
no more than 10 percent of the cases. Some school board members, however, felt that 
allowing theaters to remain open while schools were closed was discriminatory. Indi-
anapolis health officials were not swayed by this argument and denied Foltz's request 
to re-open the city's three high schools. 35 
Morgan instructed the public not to throw away used masks in public buildings 
or on the streets, but to wrap them in paper and take them home for sterilization. Masks 
could be used repeatedly if they were boiled for a half-hour, rinsed, and dried. He 
advised people to carry an extra supply of masks with them and change their masks 
three or four times each day, taking care to ensure that the same side of the mask was 
worn next to the mouth each time it was used. 36 
There was controversy regarding the efficacy of masks in preventing the spread 
of influenza. A special committee of the Columbus, Indiana, chapter of the American 
Red Cross charged that flu masks did more harm than good because they acted as germ 
collectors. Morgan refuted this claim by explaining that the masks actually performed 
two functions: they kept the wearer's germs to himself and also prevented germs that 
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might be in the air from entering his nose and mouth. Germs traveled on particles of 
dust or mucus that were nearly always large enough to be intercepted by the masks. 
Army health officials, he asserted, recommended the wearing of masks that had been 
used "with great success in other cities in forestalling the spread of the disease." Also, 
experiments reported in the Journal of the American Medical Association showed that 
the radius in which a person with a respiratory infection spread bacilli was about three 
feet; violent coughing increased that distance to ten feet. A mask lowered these radii 
to a negligible distance and eighteen inches respectively. 37 
As might be expected, the masking order was not met with the same spirit of 
cooperation as the closing order. The closing ban directly affected business owners and 
the workers they laid off, but was a much less serious inconvenience to most residents 
of Indianapolis. However, although the masking order was a trivial matter compared 
to the economic hardship caused by the closing ban, it directly affected many more 
people. Virtually everyone who went out in public had to purchase masks or the 
material to make them and also had to wear a bizarre-looking and awkward item of 
apparel that covered the nose and mouth. Perhaps if masking had been required before 
the war ended, it would have met with less resistance. While the war ground on, it was 
easy for health officials to link the struggle against the influenza epidemic on the home 
front with the war against the Huns on the Western front and make people feel that 
they were part of a united effort. The closing ban was just one more burden placed on 
a population that had already accepted food and gasoline restrictions, Liberty Bond 
drives, peach pit recycling, and much more. But, once the ban had been lifted and the 
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war was over, people were anxious to put the flu epidemic and the grim month of 
October behind them and resume a normal existence. The news that the epidemic was 
not over and that masks would have to be worn until it was must have struck the same 
chord of dismay as would an announcement that the war had been re-started. Health 
authorities could no longer appeal successfully to the sense of community solidarity that 
had sustained the war effort and that had deputized every citizen in the battle against 
influenza. Freed from the strain of constantly having to demonstrate their loyalty and 
devotion to the common cause, people were restive and prone to be critical of this fresh 
imposition of the health department's authority. 
Compliance with the masking order was half-hearted. Most people did wear 
masks at least part of the time, but some refused outright to do so. Three men were 
arrested on November 22 for being maskless, but the newspapers reported no other 
incidents of this kind. An indication of the confused state of affairs at this point in the 
epidemic is the fact that when the State Board of Health met in Indianapolis on 
November 22 neither board members nor their office assistants wore masks. When 
reporters asked Hurty about this, he replied that he refused comment. Streetcar 
conductors were not keeping windows open, requiring Morgan to send inspectors to 
ride the cars and report all violations of the ventilation order. Conductors said they 
had received no definite orders to enforce the wearing of masks and to keep windows 
open and were not sure what was expected of them, in spite of assurances from John 
Mahoney, superintendent of the traction company, that his company was cooperating. 38 
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As Thanksgiving approached and influenza cases continued to mount, the city 
health department met to consider what steps to take next. They decided to keep the 
schools closed until after the holiday and dismissed the suggestion of quarantine 
because no one knew how long those with flu remained capable of transmitting the 
disease to others. The board also considered reinstating the closing ban, but Mayor 
Jewett was opposed because of the adverse effect it would have on business. During 
the meeting, Jewett telephoned Hurty to ask for advice and was told that it was too late 
for preventive measures and that attention should be directed instead to caring for the 
sick. Hurty expressed the belief that the epidemic would not subside until virtually 
every susceptible person had been infected. 39 
The Indianapolis Health Department allowed the public libraries to reopen on 
November 29 and the schools to do so on December 2. Large numbers of teachers and 
pupils were absent during the first half of December, and Charles E. Rush, city librarian, 
reported that illness had made it difficult to keep all the branch libraries open. 
Nonetheless, the city gradually returned to normal when the epidemic came to an end 
in early January 1919. 40 After all the furor the masking order had caused, the 
newspapers reported nothing further on the matter after late November. Given the 
general ambivalence regarding the efficacy of flu masks, it is probable that people 
simply stopped wearing them and Morgan saw the futility of trying to force them to do 
so. There was not even any mention of the Indianapolis Health Department repealing 
the order, possibly because lack of public compliance had already effectively rescinded it. 
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Mobilization of Health Resources 
Mobilization efforts in Indianapolis and in the state as a whole were ill-planned, 
sporadic in nature, and generally inadequate to meet the challenge that the Spanish flu 
epidemic represented. Indiana performed no better or worse than other states in this 
regard; officials tried to prepare for the epidemic but were overwhelmed by the speed 
with which influenza spread and the deadliness of the pneumonia that accompanied it. 
The resource that was in greatest demand during the epidemic was medical 
personnel, especially nurses. This became clear very early when Lieutenant Governor 
Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts appealed to President Woodrow Wilson, the gover-
nors of nearby states that were not in the throes of the epidemic, and even to the mayor 
of Toronto for doctors and nurses to help care for victims of flu. The USPHS itself 
could not provide doctors and nurses, but began at once to recruit them throughout the 
country to go as volunteers to the Northeast. Unfortunately, medical personnel were 
in short supply everywhere in the United States; many had joined the American 
Expeditionary Force in Europe, leaving behind mostly retired doctors and those past 
the age for military service. 41 
Nurses and doctors from Indiana responded to the emergency at once. Ten 
nurses from Fort Harrison volunteered on September 27, and seventeen of the atten-
dees at the meeting of the Indiana State Medical Association being held in Indianapolis 
volunteered the following day. The nurses were sent to Camp Devens, where more 
than 2,000 cases were under treatment, and the physicians were sent there and to other 
camps in New England as well. The volunteer physicians served without rank in the 
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USPHS, but wore the insignia of the Service. Their pay consisted of a monthly stipend 
of $200 and a $4 daily travel expense. By contrast, graduate nurses who volunteered in 
Massachusetts were paid $28 a week plus expenses by the state health department. 42 
On October 9 the Cleveland-based Lake Division of the American Red Cross, 
of which Indiana was a part, ordered the Indianapolis chapter to begin a registry of all 
nurses working during the epidemic in order to facilitate the recruitment of nurses for 
foreign service. Although there were adequate numbers of trained nurses on duty to 
care for influenza patients at Fort Harrison and the training detachments, William 
Fortune, president of the New Telephone Company and head of the local Red Cross 
chapter, urged the registration of any trained nurses who would be available to assist 
should those on duty become ill or the epidemic worsen. Eliza Browning, assistant 
librarian at the Indianapolis Public Library, who chaired the educational committee of 
the Indianapolis Red Cross, volunteered her committee to oversee the registry. Indi-
anapolis women who were not trained nurses had rallied to the Red Cross's call by 
volunteering to make 7,500 gauze masks for flu patients. 43 
The earliest step taken by officials at the city or state to prepare for the epidemic 
was a meeting held by the Indiana State Board after U.S. Surgeon General Blue 
suggested that state health boards coordinate relief efforts. The board began planning 
to mobilize doctors and nurses who would be organized into "flying squadrons," which 
could be promptly dispatched where needed. The board also planned to arrange a 
conference of Red Cross officials and representatives from the Indianapolis Health 
Department, state medical societies, State Nurses Association, Public Health Nursing 
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Association, Federated Women's Clubs, Indiana Manufacturers Association, India-
napolis Merchants Association, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, and other orga-
nizations. The following day, however, King withdrew the plan because the Red Cross 
was already actively mobilizing relief in the state. 44 
Despite the fact that influenza was expected to reach official epidemic stage in 
Indianapolis within a day or two, and that the state board had received requests for 
medical assistance from already beleaguered communities, health officials lacked any 
sort of contingency plan There was no apparent reason to believe that Indianapolis or 
Indiana would escape a health crisis of some magnitude. In fact, the crisis had already 
begun, yet there was no plan in place as late as the second week of October. It is true, 
of course, that health boards were only part-time agencies with small budgets, but Hurty 
was generally something of a health zealot regardless of these constraints, and Morgan 
also had a strong sense of mission as a public health professional. It seems that they 
underestimated the seriousness of the pandemic, as did officials in other cities. For 
example, San Francisco had had even more advance warning of the epidemic than 
Indianapolis, but was no better prepared than cities in the East or Midwest. 45 
There was a serious lack of coordination insofar as recruitment of volunteer 
doctors and nurses was concerned. Dr. Charles P. Emerson, chairman of the medical 
section, State Council of Defense, reported to the Council on October 15 that separate 
appeals for physicians had been made by U.S. Surgeon General Blue, the Volunteer 
Medical Service Corps, the National Defense Council, and the Red Cross. Indiana had 
already contributed thirty doctors to combat flu in Massachusetts, and had thereby done 
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its duty in Emerson's opinion, especially in view of the fact that the epidemic was still 
raging in the state. Some counties d{d not have enough doctors to care for the sick, so 
it was important to keep all of Indiana's physicians at home where they were needed. 
On the night of the 15th, representatives of the medical and relief organizations 
mentioned above met with Emerson and several Indianapolis physicians to coordinate 
their individual relief plans and eliminate duplication of effort. The attendees agreed 
that the State Board of Health would act as a clearing house for the listing of doctors 
for flying squadrons. Prior to the meeting, the state board had requested all county 
health commissioners to obtain the names of physicians who would volunteer to give 
up their practices for a short time and serve where they were needed. The federal 
government would disburse the funds to pay their salaries through the Red Cross. 46 
The Red Cross played an active role in helping to manage the health crisis. In 
addition to being the major provider of relief services in numerous Indiana communi-
ties, it also coordinated local relief efforts. During the pandemic, the Indiana Red Cross 
spent $70,000 providing care for flu patients and their families and established 23 
emergency hospitals throughout the state. In Indianapolis, under the leadership of 
Eliza Browning, the Red Cross emergency committee vigorously recruited nurses for 
service throughout the state. The committee also worked to prevent the spread of 
influenza, deploying members of Parent-Teacher Association chapters to canvass their 
neighborhoods in search of new cases. Further, the Red Cross provided support 
services for the military by assuming responsibility for the Women's Motor Corps of 
Indiana-which formerly had been under the direction of the State Council of De-
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fense-and transporting sick and convalescent soldiers between the vocational detach-
ments and the hospital at Fort Harrison. Also, the Red Cross canteen erected a tent 
inside Union Station in downtown Indianapolis to care for troops who became ill from 
influenza while passing through the city. 47 
By October 22 the epidemic had declined in the northeastern part of Indiana, 
but it remained unchanged in the central part and was spreading rapidly in the state's 
southern counties. Medical facilities in some places were completely overwhelmed by 
the sheer number of sick people, prompting desperate officials to issue emergency 
appeals for help to the state board. Ironically, it turned out that the crisis was 
exacerbated, not so much by the lack of doctors that had been such cause for concern 
the week before, but a shortage of nurses. Given the state of medicine available at the 
time, doctors could do very little to save the lives of victims of influenza and pneumonia. 
By contrast, good nursing care was essential to survival; patients had to be kept warm, 
clean, dry, hydrated, and nourished. Their fevers had to be brought under control, but 
failing this, someone needed to keep them in bed and safe from harm if they became 
delirious. This was a time-consuming and laborious task as influenza victims were often 
ill for several weeks at a time, and were often in a critical condition for a period of days 
during which time they required care around the clock. Frequently, entire households 
were stricken simultaneously, making the need for nursing even more desperate. 48 
Dr. Edward P. Davis, president of the Volunteer Medical Service Corps of the 
Council of N a tiona! Defense, urged doctors to conserve medical resources carefully 
during the epidemic and refrain from performing surgical operations unless absolutely 
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necessary. Also, the Council and state board asked that nurses on private duty be 
released for relief work, especially to establish headquarters in various counties and 
direct nursing activities. The next day, the Lake Division of the American Red Cross 
announced that it would immediately establish emergency bureaus at Columbus, Ohio, 
Indianapolis, and Louisville to assist state health boards in combating the epidemic. 
The bureaus would search out every agency through which nurses who could be 
released from other duties could be located. They would use every means at their 
disposal to convince these nurses to "make a sacrifice, if necessary, in order to assist in 
the fight" against influenza. Recruiters were to emphasize that nursing civilians was 
just as patriotic as nursing soldiers and sailors. 49 
The need for nurses was undiminished throughout the epidemic, with the Red 
Cross working continuously to recruit every woman who could possibly perform nursing 
duties. In some communities school teachers idled by the closing ban volunteered to 
nurse flu patients. In fact, Dr. William King, assistant secretary of the state board, called 
for all Hoosier school teachers to offer their services to doctors, Red Cross bureaus, 
and community flu committees and to do clerical work or whatever was needed to help 
the situation, which "has approached a state of calamity." "The teachers are receiving 
pay while their schools are not in session and it is no more than right that they should 
offer their services to the state," he asserted. 50 
It was not always clear how best to utilize nursing resources: a nurse's efforts 
could go farther if all her patients were in one place, but in some cities the crowded 
hospitals became epidemic sites themselves. There were so many influenza patients 
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that it was often not possible to isolate them in separate wards, thus exposing to 
infection patients who were in the hospital because of some other illness. To prevent 
overcrowding of hospitals, Morgan asked that people who contracted flu arrange to be 
cared for in their homes, a strategy that would tie up nurses or cause them to waste time 
in travel that could have been spent caring for patients. With the opening of the 
emergency bureau, however, it would be possible to send nurses to private homes when 
needed. 51 
As October came to an end, the Indiana State Board of Health lifted its closing 
ban, leaving to the discretion oflocal health officers whether to continue the prohibition 
of public gatherings in their communities. It appeared that the worst was over and that 
it was time to assess the damage. Amos W. Butler, secretary of the Board of State 
Charities, informed Red Cross chapters throughout Indiana of the social agencies that 
could assist families whose resources had been severely strained by the influenza 
epidemic. There was little in the way of public assistance-no Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, Food Stamps, Social Security Disability or Survivors' benefits, no 
Veterans Benefits or unemployment compensation, no Medicaid to cover the cost of 
treatment for the chronic health problems that influenza left in its wake. There was no 
Energy Assistance Project to buy coal and kerosene for the indigent and newly poor as 
winter approached and no FEMA vouchers for disaster victims. In some communities 
influenza had been a natural disaster, but one that left the physical infrastructure intact. 
The only aid available was township trustee assistance, or poor relief, and whatever 
limited largesse might be dispensed by the city's private eleemosynary organizations. 
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The more fortunate survivors had life insurance proceeds to fall back on, but many 
widows and orphans faced a grim future. 52 
By mid-November, the epidemic flared up again and the number of new cases 
and deaths reached the levels seen in October. Hurty declared that health boards 
throughout the state, with the exception of the Indianapolis Health Department, were 
inefficient and unable to cope with the epidemic. It was not like Hurty to give in to 
despair, but he may have been exhausted by the epidemic and frustrated by his own 
and everyone else's inability to bring it to an end. At a special meeting held at the State 
House, the state board called upon Governor James P. Goodrich for relief, having 
determined that the epidemic in Indiana had passed the preventive stage. Little hope 
existed of checking the malady until all susceptible persons had contracted the disease. 
Therefore, it was imperative that all sick persons be given medical attention to prevent 
pneumonia. Up to that point, money for paying volunteer physicians had come from 
the USPHS, but that money was nearly gone and would have to be replaced by state 
funds. Numerous communities lacked doctors and had appealed for help to the state 
board, but it had no money to send doctors to stricken areas. At the time the USPHS 
was employing only five physicians in Indiana, and they were in the mining districts that 
were severely affected by the second round of influenza. 53 
King said that he was not criticizing county or city health officers; most had done 
everything in their power to fight the epidemic and some had "gone bravely to their 
deaths." It was the system that was wrong; health officials were only part-time employ-
ees, some of whom received only $25 per year, who had to attend to their own medical 
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practices and could not be expected to devote much time to their duties as health 
officials. Often they were influenced by citizens opposed to their measures and could 
not resist the pressure brought to bear on them. For example, when New Castle's health 
officer ordered residents to wear masks, they refused to do so because Muncie, a 
competing city, had no such order; without community support, the health officer had 
no choice but to rescind the order. As this incident demonstrated, health officials simply 
did not have the authority to fight the epidemic without the wholehearted cooperation 
of political and business leaders, who in some cases, King charged, were more con-
cerned with the well-being of their enterprises than of their fellow citizens. 
In an attempt to rectify the situation, the State Board of Health recommended 
that the commissions be formed in the larger cities and in all counties in Indiana to act 
as liaisons between the state board and local health officials. The commissions were 
to be composed of the chairman of the county Red Cross chapter, the mayor, members 
of the Chamber of Commerce, the school superintendent, ministers, and representa-
tives of women's clubs. The governor promised to support the board's initiative and 
vowed that money would be raised for relief. 
The Red Cross had done well in coordinating the relief effort up to that point, 
but the board's new proposal seemed to be a tacit admission of the fact that a more 
intensive effort was necessary to combat a full-scale epidemic. Specifically, broad-
based community support was essential if the epidemic was to be brought under control, 
but it was not the function of the Red Cross to obtain that support. It was instead the 
responsibility of the state board whose failure to do so had undermined the weak 
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authority and limited powers of local health officers. A more experienced organization 
would probably not have made such a strategic error, but by mid-November it was 
simply too late to undo the damage. As it turned out, only fourteen communities 
actually formed local councils; elsewhere, factional fighting interfered with the process. 
Like flu masks, local councils had come to naught and they soon vanished from the 
pages of the Star and News. 54 
Even the American Public Health Association at its national conference in 
December could not come up with a definite plan for fighting flu because of its 
members' divergent views. When its four-day conference ended, the Association 
simply distributed copies of all the medical and scientific data that members had 
presented, leaving it up to participants to decide for themselves what methods would 
work best in their own communities. This ad hoc, haphazard approach fairly well sums 
up the public health experience during the Spanish flu epidemic in Indiana-and 
elsewhere. 55 
Responses to the Pandemic in Other Indiana Communities 
The Indianapolis newspapers began printing stories about influenza in other 
cities in Indiana in late September. As was the case throughout the United States, the 
seeds of the epidemic were sown among Indiana's civilian population by soldiers and 
sailors home on leave. Most inductees from Indiana were trained at Great Lakes Naval 
Training Station and Camps Taylor, Sherman, and Grant, all of which were in the throes 
of the epidemic by late September, thus guaranteeing that the influenza virus would 
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soon be widely dispersed. For example, a news item dated September 24, 1918, 
reported six cases of flu in Peru, brought there by a young sailor on furlough from Great 
Lakes Naval Training Station who fell ill after arriving home and infected three other 
members of his family. A story the following day reported a dozen cases near Bedford, 
attributed by local authorities to soldiers home on leave from training camps. Similarly, 
the first patient in Anderson was a soldier on furlough from Camp Taylor, stricken soon 
after his arrival home. 56 
By the end of the first week of October, flu had developed in Elkhart, Henry, 
Knox, Marion, Marshall, Monroe, Shelby, and Tippecanoe counties. DeKalb, Frank-
lin, Lake, Pulaski, St. Joseph, and Wabash counties reported their first fatalities. It is 
not possible to trace the exact pattern of the spread of flu throughout Indiana because 
the State Board of Health's records of the epidemic no longer exist, but state health 
officials later observed that the epidemic had struck northern and central Indiana 
first-influenza first reached the epidemic stage in Benton County in north-central 
Indiana-and as cases began to diminish there, spread through the southern part of the 
state. In fact, the development of influenza referred to above does reflect such a 
chronological sequence: of the thirteen counties cited, seven are in the northern part 
of the state, six are in the central part, and one is in southern Indiana. 57 
These generalizations notwithstanding, flu had cropped up virtually everywhere 
in Indiana by early October; however, it did not immediately become epidemic in all 
places, nor did it always manifest itself in virulent form. Sometimes the number of cases 
would remain quite low for a week or so, leading authorities to believe that closing the 
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schools or poolrooms or banning leaf burning had in fact prevented an epidemic. Very 
often, however, flu cases would multiply without warning and a full-blown health crisis 
would have emerged. In many places, flu struck first in October, died down toward the 
end of the month, resurged from mid-November through December, diminished by the 
first half of January, with influenza remaining prevalent through April. Another 
epidemiological pattern that developed in Indiana and other parts of the country was 
the delayed spread of flu from cities and towns into their hinterlands. 
Cities throughout Indiana followed the same preventive measures as those put 
into effect in Indianapolis. As the epidemic extended into the Christmas season, public 
holiday entertainments were cancelled in Rochester, Fulton County, and in Fort 
Wayne, where special police patrolled the business district to prevent crowding in 
stores. Earlier, influenza had put a damper on Halloween festivities as authorities in 
most communities had strongly discouraged or forbidden parties and gatherings in 
celebration of the holiday. Officials in Muncie forbade the sale of Halloween masks, 
anxious Jest flu germs be transmitted when the masks were tried on. A number of cities 
had taken the initiative of issuing closing bans in advance of the State Board of Health's 
order: Terre Haute, Martinsville, Brookville, Lafayette, and others took action to close 
schools and prohibit public gatherings in the first week of October. When the state 
board sounded the all clear in late October, many cities and towns lifted their bans, but 
others kept them in place or reinstated them after the second round of influenza 
struck. 58 
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Despite their ubiquity, closing orders were a source of controversy in some 
places. For instance, the Kokomo board of health issued a very restrictive closing order 
that would have shut down all places of business except drug stores, groceries, and 
restaurants; only a strong protest by local merchants brought about a less drastic 
measure that was more in line with those in effect in other cities in Indiana. In another 
incident, the Bicknell, Knox County, health commissioner resigned because the com-
munity would not support his efforts to combat the epidemic. The Vincennes health 
officer resigned after the mayor, himself a physician, exempted theaters, movie houses, 
and churches from the reinstated closing ban. Theater managers in Indianapolis were 
a long-suffering lot who patiently endured the closing ban, but those in Terre Haute 
were not; on Thanksgiving Day, fifteen theater managers and motion picture projec-
tionists in that city defied a temporary ban which had been prompted by a sudden 
increase in the number of new influenza cases. All refused to plead guilty and asked 
for a jury trial. Even men of the cloth chafed under the ban. When the South Bend 
Health Department decided to keep the closing ban in place after the end of the 
statewide ban, Rev. P. J. Carroll of St. Joseph Church denounced the health department 
through the local press after being refused permission to hold services. Police arrested 
another priest, Rev. John Kublacki, after he refused to conform to the closing order. 59 
Health authorities in a number of counties resorted to the wearing of gauze 
masks at various times during the epidemic-usually as a last resort. A masking order 
went into effect in Richmond on November 21, in New Castle on November 22, in 
Lawrenceburg on November 29, in Madison on November 28, and in Huntington on 
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December 10. Lawrence County had required the wearing of masks in October, and 
authorities there attributed the decline of influenza in early November to this measure. 
Health officials in Brazil had issued a masking order on November 21, but cancelled it 
six days later after the number of cases dropped. When influenza resurged soon after, 
a quarantine was established instead. Authorities in Fort Wayne issued a masking 
order on December 3, but rescinded it a week later because of the questionable utility 
of masks, and also because the board of health had no statutory power to enforce the 
unpopular measure. On December 9, the Grant County health officer cancelled the 
masking order in effect there-which had largely been ignored-because he thought 
flu masks were useless. 60 
Another common and less controversial preventive measure was the prohibition 
of leaf burning. During October, Brazil, Greensburg, Anderson, and Shelbyville 
banned the outdoor burning of leaves and authorities in South Bend forbade the 
burning of paper, refuse, and rubbish in the belief that all smoke was injurious to the 
nose and throat and that ashes contributed to dust-borne infection. 61 
In 1918, Spanish influenza was most deadly in the overcrowded military camps; 
it proved nearly as disruptive, if not as virulent, in civilian institutional settings. College 
and university dormitories, orphanages, tuberculosis sanitaria, and homes for the 
elderly and the "feebleminded" were especially vulnerable to the threat of epidemic 
influenza because their residents lived in close proximity to one another. Not even 
medical facilities were immune from the pandemic. In fact, most hospitals in Muncie 
refused to admit influenza patients because of the fear of contagion, and Fort Wayne's 
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Lutheran Hospital was forced to shut down temporarily by influenza. The state 
Masonic home placed itself under a strict, but completely successful, three-month 
quarantine during which residents and employees did not leave the grounds and no 
. . d 62 VISitors entere . 
Classes at Franklin College, Indiana University, Earlham College, Hanover 
College, DePauw University, Wabash College, Indiana State Normal School, and 
Union Christian College were suspended at various times due to the epidemic. Typi-
cally, a school would close for what was expected to be a brief time, only to be forced 
to remain closed, or to re-open and close again quite soon-its students kept busy 
traveling from home to campus and back again. Most schools sent female students 
home and kept their S.A.T.C. units intact, usually under some degree of quarantine. 
Indiana University closed on October 10, but kept its S.A.T.C. men on campus. 
Assembly Hall was turned into an emergency hospital and President William Lowe 
Bryan donned a mask like the other nurses who cared for the nearly one hundred 
students ill with Spanish influenza. Fortunately, most cases of influenza among college 
and university students were mild ones and consequently the number of deaths was 
quite low. 63 Influenza was more serious at the Boys Correctional School in Plainfield 
and the Indiana Reformatory at Jeffersonville, but few deaths resulted at either facility. 
Flu also struck the Catholic Orphans' Home in Fort Wayne, and infected 70 percent of 
the children at the Sailors and Soldiers Orphans Home near Knightstown. 64 
In view of the large numbers of people suddenly ill and unable to care for 
themselves, it is not surprising that existing medical resources were quickly outstripped. 
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In many communities facilities such as Elks lodges (Princeton, Madison, Boonville), the 
local aerie of Eagles (Bicknell), and the Phoenix Club, "a fashionable Jewish club" in 
Terre Haute, were rapidly converted into emergency hospitals where flu victims could 
be nursed back to health. Brown County had only four physicians, few nurses, and no 
hospitals. Two nurses were sent from Indianapolis, many reports being made of entire 
families ill with no one to care for them. 65 Even if there had been adequate numbers 
of doctors and nurses, it would have been difficult for them to reach people living in 
remote parts of a largely rural, hilly, heavily wooded county. As it was, it is surprising 
that no one in Indiana was reported to have died from cold or hunger because they 
were too weak to cook-in an era when food preparation and staying warm was real 
work--or unable to chop firewood, stoke a coal fire, or keep a fire going in the fireplace. 
In recognition of this fact, officials in Muncie considered establishing neighborhood 
food stations to feed stricken families with meals prepared in school kitchens. 66 
Everyday life was disrupted by the epidemic in many unexpected ways. The 
John Robinson Circus was forced to return to its winter quarters in Peru a month early 
due to the epidemic. Because of the large number of flu deaths throughout the country, 
there was a "famine" of natural cut flowers in Muncie, with florists refusing to sell 
flowers for any occasion other than funerals. 67 Caskets were at a premium in the 
eastern part of the country. Working on a rush order for the government for flu victims 
in Washington, D.C., the Richmond Casket Company began turning out caskets at the 
rate of one every four minutes. Several days later three casket companies in Richmond 
were swamped with government orders for caskets for influenza victims in the East and 
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requested volunteers to assist in their manufacture. The Indianapolis Casket Company 
received instructions from the War Board to restrict production to none but the 
simplest models in order to prevent a casket shortage in the parts of the country severely 
affected by influenza. 68 
An incident in Elkhart evokes one of the most fearsome images of epidemics-
corpses of plague victims accumulating too rapidly for the living to give them a decent 
burial. Although the situation never became so desperate in the United States as it did 
in some other parts of the world, the epidemic did strain some very critical resources 
to the limit. An average of four people were dying in Elkhart each day; the city's old 
cemetery was full and long-deferred improvements at the newer cemetery made burials 
there impossible. The hearse in one funeral procession sank in deep mud, requiring 
the pallbearers and mourners to carry the casket several blocks to the grave. 69 
Coal output was seriously affected in the mines of southwestern Indiana as well 
as in other parts of the nation. During the last week of October, coal production had 
declined significantly due to absenteeism caused by influenza-a matter of concern to 
the federal government and to virtually everyone else in a time when coal was the 
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The epidemic also interfered with the sale of War Savings stamps and the 
redemption of pledges made during earlier drives. This was due in part to wages lost 
to illness and underemployment because of the closing ban. More significant, however, 
was the closing of schools, that prevented the sales efforts of the "school children 
salesmen of the War Savings Thrift Army." 71 
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The Shelby County draft board was forced to stop work on October 18 because 
rampant influenza left no physicians free to examine inductees. The Elkhart County 
draft board in Goshen refused to conduct any physical exams while flu was epidemic; 
board members reasoned that the disease was being spread by men from various parts 
of the county assembling in large numbers. Elkhart County is Mennonite country, so 
the board's decision may have been influenced by that group's pacifistic beliefs, but 
many servicemen not only carried the infection wherever they went but also frequently 
became ill themselves while traveling from one post to another. Twenty-two soldiers 
who fell ill while en route from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to an eastern camp were removed 
from the troop train at Marion and taken to a barracks at the Soldiers' Home for 
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nursmg. 
Appendix 1 shows the total number of influenza and pneumonia deaths in 
Indiana cities of the first through the fifth classes for the period September 1 through 
December 31, 1918. (Cities of the first class were those with a population of 100,000 
or more; cities of the fifth class had populations between 5,000 and 10,000.) The cities 
most severely affected by the pandemic were Gary, with a death rate of 11.4 per 
thousand; Hammond, 8.4; Connersville, 7.5; and East Chicago, 7.4. Those with the 
lowest death rates were Kendallville and Hartford City, both of which lost fewer than 
one person per thousand to Spanish influenza. Indianapolis ranked in the middle, with 
a death rate of 3.5, slightly below the overall statewide average for cities of 3.9. There 
was not necessarily an association between the number of cases and the number of 
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deaths; the mortality caused by flu and pneumonia in Indiana differed from place to 
place for no apparent reason just as it did elsewhere. 73 
78 
CHAPTER 4: 
Putting the Pandemic in Context 
Medical Advice and Popular Health Practices 
Even with the benefit of hindsight and seventy-five years of medical and scien-
tific advances, it is still not possible to determine with certainty the effectiveness of the 
preventive techniques in use during the pandemic. The lack of consensus among 
doctors and health officials at the time is evident from the proceedings of the convention 
of the American Public Health Association, dedicated to the Spanish influenza epi-
demic, which was held in December 1918. After lengthy and inconclusive debates on 
the efficacy of gauze masks and closing bans, a panel of five conferees was appointed 
to sift through the reports and evidence presented and come up with recommendations 
before the conference adjourned. 1 After due deliberation, the panel reported their 
findings: Generally, attendees from the Southeast strongly favored strict quarantine 
measures, those from smaller cities were somewhat in favor of quarantine and masks, 
and those from larger cities opposed both masks and quarantine and placed great 
reliance on vaccine. Panel members were unable to agree on anything further, how-
ever, and the convention ended on a somewhat disheartening note with participants 
returning to their communities no better armed to fight influenza than before. 2 
Before the Great Pandemic, medical practitioners had been secure in their 
belief that the cause of influenza was known. In the early 1890s, during the previous 
flu pandemic, Richard Pfeiffer, head of the research department of Berlin's Institute 
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for Infectious Diseases, had isolated a bacillus found in the sputum of flu patients that 
he thought was the cause of influenza. He was never able to conclusively prove this 
and never claimed to have done so, yet the scientific community came to believe that 
Pfeiffer's bacillus did indeed cause influenza.3 Their belief was eroded, however, as 
the epidemic of 1918 progressed. Bacteriologists did indeed find large numbers of 
Pfeiffer's bacillus in the throats of flu patients, but attempts to induce cases of influenza 
in human volunteers by inoculating them with cultures made from these bacteria were 
unsuccessful. 4 
Medical researchers knew by 1918 that some diseases were caused by microbes 
much smaller than bacteria. These microorganisms were referred to as "filtrable 
viruses" because they could pass through filters that trapped bacteria, or "ultra-visible" 
viruses because they could not be seen with ordinary microscopes, but no one had been 
able to isolate one. Viruses were not cultivated until 1935 when Wilson Smith, one of 
a team of British researchers working on viruses at the National Institute for Medical 
Research in London, found that the influenza virus could be grown in live chick 
embryos. Most bacteria are able to reproduce in chemically defined growth media such 
as agar and sugar, but viruses can do so only by invading and preempting the metabolic 
processes of another living organism's cells. As it happens, the influenza virus was 
relatively easy to work with in the laboratory, so once it was isolated, researchers were 
able to learn more about it than many of the other viruses that affect humans. 
During the pandemic, bacteriologists feverishly sought the cure for Spanish 
influenza, performing many experiments to determine whether a virus was its etiolog-
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ical agent. However, their efforts were doomed to failure by reason of the crude and 
inadequate technical methods available at the time. 5 Equally futile efforts were made 
to develop an effective influenza vaccine. Doctors in Philadelphia, Boston, and New 
York City produced vaccines with which large numbers of people were inoculated, but 
their only function was to help calm people's nerves and demonstrate that medical 
science was actively doing something to combat the epidemic. 6 
Although health authorities did not know what caused influenza, they knew 
quite a bit about other aspects of the disease. They knew its long history and that its 
name actually had nothing to do with its origins either in the case of the current 
pandemic or in those that had occurred in the past. They also understood its mode of 
transmission via droplet infection, which was one reason for the frequent and vehement 
denunciation of public coughers and spitters. 7 Thousands of droplets of mucous or 
saliva are blown into the air when a person coughs or sneezes and can be inhaled by 
anyone nearby. Most quickly dry out and become "droplet nuclei" that contain the 
viruses or bacteria present in the mouth or respiratory tract of the person emitting them. 
Authorities understood this, but did not realize that the droplet nuclei could float about 
in the air for hours, and the influenza virus on them could survive just as long unless 
exposed to sunlight. 8 
Dr. Hurty and Dr. Morgan often spoke of the virtues of fresh air, and the 
importance of keeping homes, public buildings, and streetcars and other public con-
veyances well ventilated. They believed that the presence of fresh, cold air in and of 
itself was somehow healthier than heated, "used" air that had been breathed by other 
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people. This is partly true, but the crucial point is that air without droplet nuclei in 
it-whether from outdoors or simply from another part of a building-should be kept 
circulating through air that does contain infectious agents, in essence diluting the "used" 
air. Dr. Morgan warned the public that an "overheated house is conducive to the 
development of organisms which cause respiratory infections." 9 That was half-true; 
the crucial factor was the purity of the air rather than its temperature. 
Hurty referred to colds and influenza as "house diseases" and Morgan encour-
aged people to air their houses frequently in order to make them "uninviting" to cold 
and pneumonia germs, implying that these organisms were lurking indoors waiting to 
infect the unwary. 10 It is known now, of course, that viruses cannot survive for long 
outside a living host, and cannot therefore be found in cracks and corners, even very 
dirty ones. Rather they are present in some human respiratory systems year-round, 
and are much more easily transmitted from person to person during the winter when 
the arrival of cold weather drives people indoors and causes them to spend more time 
in unventilated areas in closer proximity to others. 11 
Another aspect of influenza not completely understood at the time of the Great 
Pandemic was the length of transmission time. Authorities knew that people could be 
infected before they showed symptoms and that the length of the incubation period was 
one to four days, but did not know how long patients remained capable of transmitting 
influenza during and after their episode of illness. Research has since demonstrated 
that the rapidity with which influenza spreads is due to a very short incubation period 
of one to three days; the virus multiplies in the surface membranes of the respiratory 
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tract from which it is readily shed into the air. Shedding, which occurs two to five days 
before symptoms appear, starts about twenty-four hours after exposure to infection 
and continues for only about a week, so the virus must spread quickly or it will die out. 12 
Returning to the question of the utility of masks, health authorities still are not 
in complete agreement. Alfred Crosby, Professor of American Studies at the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin, whose work on the Spanish influenza pandemic in the United 
States is the most recent and comprehensive historical study available, summarizes the 
situation as follows: 
People could and did honestly believe that a few layers of gauze 
would keep out flu bugs, just as screens kept the flies off the front porch. 
The influenza virus itself is, of course, so infinitely tiny that it can pass 
through any cloth, no matter how tightly woven, but a mask can catch 
some of the motes of dust and droplettes of water on which the virus may 
be riding. However, to be even slightly effective during a flu epidemic 
masks must be worn at all times when people are together, at home and 
at work and in between, must be of a proper and probably uncomfortable 
thickness, must be tied firmly, and must be washed and dried at least once 
daily. Enforcement of such conditions is impossible and so the commu-
nities where masking was compulsory almost always had health records 
the same as adjacent communities without masking. 13 
A group interview with Julia Butwin, Chief Nurse Consultant, Acute Disease 
Division; Donnell P. Ewert, M.P.H., Epidemiologist, Communicable Disease; and 
Chun Zhou, DVM, MS, Dr. PH, Veterinary Epidemiologist, Acute Division-all of the 
Indiana State Board of Health, helped shed light on this and other questions. So too 
did a separate interview with Martha Bennington, senior nurse epidemiologist in 
communicable disease investigation with the Marion County Health Department. Dr. 
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Ewert's opinion was that masking an infected person would possibly cut down on flu 
transmission to some extent, but he was concerned by "what might be growing in a mask 
after coughing and sneezing into it." Also, because most transmission occurs indoors, 
wearing a mask outdoors would be of little benefit. Ms. Bennington agreed that 
masking patients was of some use in limiting salivary emissions, but as far as uninfected 
wearers were concerned, did nothing other than give them a false sense of security. She 
explained: "In order for something to get down into the alveoli of your lungs, it has got 
to be one to five microns in size; that's incredibly small." Unlike the loose-fitting gauge 
masks worn in 1918, the particulate respirators and hepa filter masks available now can 
provide this level of protection, but only if they fit very tightly. 
Regarding the closing ban, the interviewees from the State Board of Health 
were skeptical of the utility of this method of preventing disease. Furthermore, they 
doubted that the public would accept its imposition nowadays. Ms. Bennington was 
more in favor of the prohibition on public gatherings, especially in view of the fact that 
flu can be transmitted before people are aware they are infected. 
Other advice given the public by health authorities during the pandemic of 1918 
has stood the test of time. Dr. Morgan warned against shaking hands with someone 
who had smothered a cough or sneeze without a handkerchief because contagion could 
occur in this way. Health advice appearing November 15, 1993, in "Ask Dr. Lamb," a 
column syndicated daily in the Indianapolis Star differs little from that disseminated by 
Morgan in 1918. Dr. Lamb cautioned that the viruses causing influenza can survive 
several hours on hands or inanimate surfaces, and contaminated fingers can inoculate 
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the nose or mouth, so it is advisable to wear gloves when out in public and to wash one's 
hands after returning home. He also noted that those who are exposed to the greatest 
number of people are most likely to become infected with a cold or influenza; this 
suggests that closing bans derived their effectiveness, not only from the prevention of 
the multiple, concentrated contacts that occur in a crowd setting, but also from limiting 
the total number of single contacts individuals had. 14 
As far as treatment is concerned, nothing was available in 1918. At the start of 
the epidemic, doctors in Boston immediately noticed that many of their Spanish 
influenza patients developed pneumonia. Even today, there is no cure for influenza, 
although Ripoviran, an antiviral agent, and two other drugs, Amantadine and 
Romantadine, are sometimes administered to high risk patients to prevent serious 
illness from developing. Viral infection is dangerous because it depletes the immune 
system, leaving patients vulnerable to bacterial infections that can have fatal conse-
quences. Fortunately, antibiotics are available today to cure bacterial infections, but 
they were not in 1918, so many deaths resulted from the pneumonia that followed 
Spanish flu. 15 
One aspect of the health advice offered in 1918 that is no longer emphasized 
today is the concern with bodily excretions. Morgan stated that "elimination is abso-
lutely necessary for perfect health." A circular distributed by the State Board of Health 
encouraged people to "take medicine to open the bowels freely." The Chicago Health 
Department instructed marchers in a huge Liberty Loan parade "to go home right after, 
remove all clothing, rub the body dry, and take a laxative" to minimize their chances of 
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contracting influenza. The patent medicine ads, which appeared on most pages of the 
newspaper, touted a plethora of remedies for constipation and numerous other physical 
ills. 16 
The advertising copy describing these patent medicines was couched in terms 
reminiscent of traditional medicine, attributing a wide variety of ailments and symptoms 
to constipation and other accumulations of unexcreted "poisons." Physicians treated 
patients by doing things believed to help the body regain its customary equilibrium; they 
were expected to extract blood, make the patient perspire copiously, or administer 
diuretics, laxatives, and emetics. Bleeding had fallen into disfavor by the last part of 
the nineteenth century and diuretics and emetics were no longer used as a matter of 
course, but as the number of laxatives on the market indicate, purging the bowels was 
still widely accepted as a beneficial practice capable of remedying a host of com-
plaints. 17 For example, Carter's Little Liver Pills for Constipation claimed to be 
"wonderfully quick to banish biliousness, headache, indigestion and to clear up a bad 
complexion." Dr. Caldwell's Syrup Pepsin, "a mild, effective remedy for constipation," 
was "peculiarly adapted to the needs of elderly people, women and children," and 
Cascarets tablets boasted of being able to "Gently Clean the Liver and Bowels, and 
Stop Headache, Colds, Sour Stomach, Bad Breath." 18 
Some remedies claimed to prevent or cure Spanish influenza in addition to 
restoring regularity. For example, Father John's Medicine, an "old-fashioned, whole-
some body builder" had a "gentle laxative effect" guaranteed to drive out "impurities" 
even while it fought the flu. Many advertisements were written in a bland, amateurish 
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style, but the maker of "Dr. Pierce's" patent medicines adopted a tone much more in 
keeping with the times: "How to Fight Spanish Influenza. Avoid crowds, coughs and 
cowards, but fear neither germs or Germans! To keep the liver and bowels regular and 
to carry away the poisons within-Dr. Pierce's Pleasant Pellets. If there is a cold-An-
uric tablets to flush the bladder and kidneys and carry off poisonous matter." 19 
The therapeutic vacuum left by medical science was filled by a wide variety of 
nostrums with putative antiseptic properties that claimed to prevent or cure influenza. 
Nostriola, which came in "balm, liquid, or Nostiola Outfit form," was an "antiseptic, 
cleansing" substance that "Opens Air Passages, and Prevents Disease of Nose, Throat 
and Bronchial Tubes." Vick's VapoRub made similar claims and urged people infected 
with flu to, among other things, "Go to Bed and Stay Quiet-Take a Laxative." Ads 
for Kondon's Catarrhal Jelly informed "those who fear Spanish Influenza" that "many 
doctors are urging the use" of this "soothing antiseptic for inside the nose and head." 20 
As the epidemic gained strength, the manufacturers of popular tonics touted 
their products' usefulness in fighting off an attack of influenza. The makers of Peruna 
Tonic recommended it for "Catarrh of Every Description" because of its ability to 
restore and maintain all mucous membranes, which made it "the greatest disease 
preventive known to science." Another product, Miller's Antiseptic Oil, which was also 
"known as Snake Oil," was making it possible for "many thousands" to find relief from 
. fl d h . 21 m uenza an per aps prevent pneumoma. 
As the epidemic waned, advertisers began to focus on the aftermath of an attack 
of influenza and boasted of their product's restorative powers. Scott's Emulsion, "a 
87 
pure, wholesome tonic-food," would aid in "recuperation of the vital forces of the body, 
depleted in the struggle with acute disease." Borden's Malted Milk and Horlick's 
Malted Milk both claimed to have special nutritional value, and another familiar 
product, Lysol Disinfectant, urged the homemaker to "Fight Spanish Influenza with 
Daily Disinfection." 22 
It is difficult to determine what proportion of the public took these and the many 
other nostrums advertised seriously or purchased them for prophylactic use. If they 
had not been fairly popular, the U.S. Surgeon General probably would not have felt it 
necessary to warn the public against them. 23 The patent medicines and their claims 
are easy targets for ridicule now, but at the time they offered protection from a 
frightening illness when conventional medicine, with its failed vaccines, could not. 
Mortality in the United States and Worldwide 
Spanish flu was deadly because it spread so quickly and widely and infected so 
many people and not because it was particularly lethal. In fact, despite the large 
numbers of people who died from it, Spanish flu had a fairly low case mortality; that is, 
it rarely killed more than 2 percent to 3 percent of those infected. By conservative 
estimate, 20 percent of the world 's population was infected, and serologic evidence 
suggests that the vast majority of those who did not become ill from flu had subclinical 
cases of it. 24 
The total mortality worldwide can only be estimated because of the lack of death 
records in some parts of Asia and Africa, but in 1927 noted American epidemiologist 
88 
Edwin Oakes Jordan computed the number of deaths to have been 21.6 million: more 
than 1.4 million in the Americas, 2.2 million in Europe, 15.8 million in Asia, just under 
1 million in Australia and Oceania, and 1.3 million in Africa and Madagascar. Russia 
lost 450,000 people; Italy and Japan, much smaller countries, lost 375,000 and 257,000 
people respectively. The pandemic killed over 12 million in India, manifesting itself 
with especial brutality in the Punjab. People died in that region so rapidly and in such 
numbers that corpses littered the streets and trains had to be cleared of dead and dying 
h . 25 passengers at eac station. 
Geographically isolated groups, who had developed little immunity to diseases, 
were terribly vulnerable. Nearly 25 percent of Samoans died, and some Alaskan 
Eskimo villages lost all their adult members to influenza, while others were completely 
depopulated-stunning levels of fatality comparable to those suffered by native Amer-
ican populations during their initial contacts with Europeans and exposure to the 
diseases of the Old World. American Indians were, in fact, severely stricken by Spanish 
influenza; 24 percent of those living on reservations became ill and 9 percent of these 
flu victims died-a case mortality rate four times greater than that in large American 
cities. Two percent of all American Indians died in the epidemic. 26 
Accurate estimates of total mortality in the United States are not available, 
primarily because the Census Bureau's Mortality Statistics did not include all48 states 
at the time. Except for certain of their cities, 17 western and southern states where 22 
percent of the nation's population resided, were omitted from the United States Death 
Registration Area. 27 The USPHS made house-to-house surveys in eleven American 
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cities and towns across the nation in 1919 and discovered that 280 out of every 1,000 
persons in these communities had had flu during the pandemic. This figure is similar 
to others derived from similar surveys in the United States and elsewhere in the world. 
Extrapolating to the country as a whole, this finding indicates that over one-fourth of 
the total population, or 25 million people, had been infected with Spanish influenza. 
The total number of Americans who died from flu between September 1918 and June 
1919 is estimated to be 675,000. This is a fairly conservative estimate, given that the 
census Registration Area showed 549,000 deaths. (By comparison, the combined battle 
deaths of U.S. Armed Forces personnel in World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam 
were 423,000.) 28 
Death rates among the military were higher than in the civilian population. The 
U.S. Navy estimated that 40 percent of naval personnel had contracted flu in 1918. 
Although a lower proportion of soldiers than sailors caught the flu in 1918--16 percent 
of those involved in the war-infection rates differed between soldiers abroad and 
those who never made it to Europe: 167 out of every 1,000 members of the American 
Expeditionary Force were officially admitted to treatment as flu patients compared to 
361 out of every 1,000 trainees based in the United States. The combined total of 
American soldiers and sailors who died of flu is 43,000, a figure equal to 80 percent of 
American battle deaths in the war, which took place during a much longer period of 
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time. 
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Social Impact and Personal Loss 
The Great Pandemic of 1918 was over in a few months. It materialized suddenly, 
cut a swath through the land, and was gone. Unlike the United State's involvement in 
the war, which lasted a year and a half and made an indelible impression on the fabric 
of American life, the epidemic was a significant factor for people in this country only 
from September through December 1918 and had little enduring impact. But, however 
brief its duration, the epidemic nonetheless did immeasurable harm on the personal 
level and caused an incalculable amount of human suffering. It is the contemplation 
of the tragic events that befell so many people during the epidemic and the feelings of 
commiseration and pity they arouse in us that give the pandemic and other natural 
disasters a certain fascination. Unlike the Holocaust, the Gulag, and other appalling 
products of human villainy, the occurrence of natural disasters does not call into 
question the basic nature of humankind or divide the species into victims and victimiz-
ers. Instead, epidemics and earthquakes, shipwrecks and airplane crashes serve as 
clear reminders that all of us are subject to good and bad fortune and the odd twist of 
fate. 
The Spanish influenza epidemic, like any natural disaster, caught people by 
surprise. First, it killed many recruits who would have been more reasonably expected 
to die from enemy fire. Some towns lost five, ten, or more of their young men to 
influenza before they ever got to the war. For example, Oscar A. Dannenberg, 24, who 
died October 14, 1918, at Camp Custer, was the fourteenth soldier from Evansville to 
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die of influenza; Walter Morgan, 23, who died at Camp Sherman, was the seventh boy 
from Greensburg to die of pneumonia in a military camp. 29 
Influenza took others by surprise as they sought to bring solace to their sick 
relatives. The newspapers published frequent accounts of wives and mothers becoming 
infected with the Spanish flu virus while visiting or nursing husbands or sons at military 
camps. When this happened at Camp Dix, New Jersey, the women were cared for at 
the camp's Red Cross hospital. The danger of contagion did not deter the mothers of 
stricken soldiers from flocking to Camp Sherman, but camp officials required them to 
wear influenza masks while they visited their sons in the hospital wards. One woman, 
Mrs. Morris Miller, a Goshen resident, became ill with influenza after going to Camp 
Taylor to be with her dying brother, Otis Witmer. Private Witmer had been in the army 
less than six weeks before his fatal illness. 30 
Parents with children away at college faced the same hazards as those with sons 
in military camps. Several mothers who came to Miami University in Ohio to be with 
sick sons or daughters succumbed to the disease, and at least one died. Another parent, 
Edward Carman, fought influenza on two fronts. While caring for his wife and four 
younger children who were ill with influenza at their home in Burney, Indiana, Carman 
commuted daily by automobile to Franklin College, forty miles away, to visit his son, 
Harry, who was fatally ill with pneumonia at the S.A.T.C. unit there. 31 
Some flu victims, such as John Abels of Shoals, Indiana, contracted their fatal 
case of flu while attending the funeral of a relative who had died from the disease or 
when bringing a relative's body home from a military camp. The government paid for 
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transportation home for relatives who came to accompany the bodies of men who had 
died from influenza in military camps, a policy that may have inadvertently helped 
spread influenza a little faster. 32 
One especially surprising aspect of Spanish influenza was the rapidity with which 
it spread and prostrated its victims, and the stunning swiftness with which it progressed 
to pneumonia. Joseph Risenbeck, a thirty-eight-year-old druggist from the southside 
of Indianapolis, died at St. Francis Hospital on the afternoon of October 9; he had been 
taken to the hospital after collapsing at his drug store and died only a few hours later 
from pneumonia. Helen Stout, a teenager from Woodruff Place, thought to be recov-
ering from influenza after an illness of less than a week, died suddenly from heart failure 
and bronchial pneumonia. John Richardson, a twenty-nine-year-old Indianapolis man 
working at the army headquarters depot in Jeffersonville, Indiana, collapsed without 
warning and died of bronchial pneumonia before the physician who had been sum-
moned could get to his home. 33 
The precipitous decline of flu victims often meant that family members could 
not reach their deathbeds in time to bid them farewell. Trains and telegrams could not 
keep pace with the angel of death, a fact which gave a special touch of pathos to the 
loss of a spouse or a child. The newspapers frequently described the scenario of 
travelers narrowly missing the telegram that would have spared them a futile journey 
or of others who received the dreaded announcement as they waited at the depot. The 
family of Jesse Felts, a young sailor gravely ill from pneumonia at Great Lakes Naval 
Training Station, had such an experience. Soon after his bride of three weeks, his 
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mother, and brother had left Indianapolis for Chicago early on September 21, 1918, to 
be by his side, his sister received the telegram that announced his death. Just as Mrs. 
G. E. Walters was boarding a train at the Pennsylvania railroad station in Logansport 
to go to the bedside of her son, Private Warren Walters, 21, stationed at an army camp 
at Green Bay, Wisconsin, she received a telegram advising of his death. The father of 
Goshen, Indiana, recruit Private Harold Densmore, stricken with influenza at the 
Columbus army barracks, was about to board the train that would take him there when 
word came that his son had already died. Mrs. Jack Matheson was in the telegraph 
office in Bedford, Indiana, about to send a message to her husband, a stonecutter who 
had been at the Hog Island, Philadelphia, shipyard only ten days, when the telegram 
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The highly contagious nature of influenza meant that entire families were 
stricken with the illness at the same time. Several such cases were reported in the 
Indianapolis newspapers. On October 18, 1918, two bicycle policemen discovered 
twelve people seriously ill with influenza in a small house on Indianapolis' near-
southside. The two families sharing the house had each lost an infant to influenza 
several hours before they were found. Their meager savings had been depleted when 
both fathers became too ill to work, and they had no money for food or medicine. All 
were too ill to help any of the others or summon aid from neighbors. A family living 
near Nashville, Indiana, suffered a similar ordeal: Paul Ringer, whose home had no 
telephone and was a mile from the public road or the nearest neighbor, crawled on his 
hand and knees to the highway to get help for himself, his wife, and four small children, 
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all severely stricken with influenza. After reaching the lightly traveled highway, he 
waited for over an hour until the first passerby appeared to summon aid. 35 
A particularly tragic result of the spread of influenza within families was the not 
infrequent occurrence of the death of both parents, often within a fairly short period 
of time. Harold Wallace of Hammond and his wife Ruth, twenty, died of Spanish 
influenza on October 10, 1918, within a few minutes of each other. Edward, thirty, and 
Nancy Meldrum, twenty-six, residents of near-eastside Indianapolis, died of pneumonia 
within two days of each other, leaving two young children, both of whom were ill with 
influenza. In New Albany, Indiana, William Dierking, thirty-four, died of influenza on 
October 19; his wife had died three days before. They were survived by three small 
children. Edna Harmon, twenty-two, died of pneumonia in Brazil, Indiana, twenty-four 
hours after her husband had died of the same disease. Her brother and sister were 
critically ill as well. She was survived by two children. 36 
As these examples indicate, influenza was responsible for the break-up of a large 
number of families, not only in Indiana but all over the world. Spanish influenza 
notwithstanding, dissolution of the family unit due to the death of one or both parents 
was not an uncommon event in the early twentieth century. Among other factors, lower 
life expectancies resulting from the relatively undeveloped state of medicine and public 
sanitation meant that the loss of a parent would be experienced by a larger proportion 
of children and youth than is the case today. However, even though the phenomenon 
of children with no one to care for them was a normal part of life, the pandemic 
burdened social institutions because it produced so many orphans within so short a 
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time. Of course, the war contributed to the disruption of families by depriving children 
of their fathers, sometimes forever, but the flu epidemic was doubly cruel because it 
not infrequently took both parents. 
According to the estimates of the State Board of Health, the influenza epidemic 
orphaned an estimated 5,500 children in Indiana between September 1 and November 
30, 1918. During that time, the deaths of 2,773 married persons from influenza and 
pneumonia were reported to the State Board; based on the assumption that each was 
the parent of an average of two children, 5,546 orphans would have resulted from the 
epidemic. The tragic effect of the epidemic elsewhere in the country was reflected in 
a large photograph of 25 little girls, between 3 and 5 years of age, that appeared on the 
front page of the Star on December 13, 1918. The youngsters, who had been orphaned 
by the pandemic, were being sent from the New York Foundling Asylum to adoptive 
homes in the western United States. One cannot help but speculate on the varied fates 
of these young children and the thousands of others like them. No one knows what 
kind of homes they came from or were going to; for some the epidemic may have meant 
an improvement in their life chances, for others, a reversal. As an example of the latter, 
author Mary McCarthy described her own near-Dickensian experience as an orphan 
in her autobiography, Memories of a Catholic Girlhood. At six years of age, she and 
four younger siblings lost their loving and indulgent parents to influenza within the 
space of a few hours, only to have them replaced by harsh and indifferent caretakers. 37 
Sometimes the epidemic wiped out a small family: Frank J. Connell, his wife, 
and their ten-year-old daughter of Camden, New Jersey, all died on October 7, 1918, 
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in the Connell home within a period of five hours. More often, however, the pandemic 
decimated a family's ranks, claiming two or more members. Florence Pickens, thirty, 
a graduate of Methodist Hospital nursing school and superintendent of a hospital in St. 
Paul, Minnesota, died from influenza on November 2, 1918. She had come to India-
napolis to attend her brother's funeral and fell ill the day he was buried. The twenty-
nine-year-old wife of a westside Indianapolis minister, Rev. John Mason, and his 
five-year-old son John, Jr., died at the city hospital of pneumonia. Another child was 
in critical condition. Another westside family was struck by tragedy when Iva Mitchell, 
twenty-nine, and her daughter Mary, five , died of flu, leaving Fred Mitchell seriously ill 
from the same disease. Charles and Harold Isenhower, adult sons of a prominent 
livestock auctioneer from Martinsville, died from influenza within five days of each 
other. Four of the five children of Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Vest of Speed, near Jefferson-
ville, Indiana, died of influenza within a two-week period. The entire family had been 
ill, but the parents and an infant recovered. A farmer from Crothersville, James 
Langdon, died at ten o'clock on the morning of November 20, followed half an hour 
later by his twenty-year-old son; his eighteen-year-old daughter had died the previous 
night. Another son was ill. 38 
Influenza also caused several deaths and other misfortune in odd, indirect ways. 
Colonel Charles B. Hagadorn, acting commandant of Camp Grant at Rockville, Illinois, 
shot himself due to worry over the pneumonia epidemic that had killed more than five 
hundred men at the camp. Dr. Charles Sudranski, one of the leading doctors in Putnam 
County and the examining physician for the county draft board, killed himself in despair 
97 
over the loss of his wife who had died from pneumonia a week before. After visiting a 
patient on the afternoon of Sunday, October 27, 1918, Sudranski went into a nearby 
field and cut his jugular vein. Survivors included his three young children. Mrs. Lavina 
Burbrink of Jonesville, the widow of Frank Burbrink who died of influenza at Camp 
Custer, was declared insane by a commission in October 1918. Its report attributed her 
mental breakdown to her husband's recent death. 39 
Influenza played an pivotal role in two dramatic tales when it struck unexpect-
edly. One involved a young Indianapolis woman, Lillian Ricketts, who had fled the city 
in 1912 to escape her domineering father, a wealthy medicine manufacturer. Mr. 
Ricketts had hired detectives to search for her all over the country, but they could not 
find her. In mid-November 1918, her sister received a letter from the man Lillian had 
subsequently married, telling of her death from pneumonia and the events of her life 
after her disappearance. Lillian had gone to Detroit, assumed a different name, found 
an office job with a motor company, and eventually met her future husband. They 
married and had a child who was eight months old at the time of her death. Lillian had 
made her husband swear to keep her secret, but he thought her sister should know of 
her death. 40 
The death of 20-year-old Leah Overstreet in Ladoga after a three-day bout with 
influenza deprived Montgomery County Circuit Court of a divorce case that promised 
to be the "most sensational suit" ever heard by that body. The week before her death, 
Mrs. Overstreet had filed a suit for divorce in which she made "grave and sensational" 
charges alleging that her husband had moved to a farm in 1917 to evade the draft and 
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that as soon as the armistice was signed he had begun "a course of cruel and inhuman 
treatment" that drove her from home. She asked the court to set aside several recent 
sales of property, which she said her husband had made without her consent. 41 
Not surprisingly, the pandemic killed a number of nurses and doctors who 
contracted influenza from their patients. Records indicate that approximately twenty-
five physicians died of influenza in Indiana during the pandemic, but this source did not 
report the number of nurses who lost their lives. It is probable that more nurses than 
doctors died from influenza, not only because members of the former profession 
outnumber those of the latter but also because those physicians who remained in this 
country were on average not in the age groups especially susceptible to influenza. 42 
The deaths of only one physician and one dentist appeared among the obituaries 
of flu victims in Indianapolis, but the death notices of at least nine nurses were printed 
during the same period. Five nurses died in the course of performing their duties in 
Indianapolis hospitals. Chloe Miller, thirty-two, a twelve-year veteran, had been 
working as a visiting nurse only two weeks before coming down with influenza; Eileen 
Miller, twenty-eight, was a nurse at Deaconess Hospital when she died of pneumonia; 
Sr. Patrice Kennedy, thirty, had been in charge of St. Vincent Hospital pharmacy for 
four years before her death from pneumonia; Catherine Libka, twenty-nine, was 
surgery superintendent at City Hospital when she died of pneumonia. Methodist 
Hospital lost its employee with the greatest seniority, night superintendent Mary Edna 
Fletcher, thirty-three, when her life was claimed by bronchial pneumonia. Four other 
nurses died in the communities or camps where they had gone as volunteers. Beatrice 
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Davis, thirty, died of flu at Clay City after nursing her brother's family back to health. 
Ethel Leach, a Red Cross nurse sent to the East, died from pneumonia at the Edge-
wood, Maryland Arsenal. Pauline Collins, twenty-eight, died of pneumonia at Univer-
sal, a mining town near Clinton, where she had been sent by the Red Cross. Florence 
LeClaire, twenty-four, a volunteer Red Cross nurse, died of influenza at Camp Devens; 
she contracted the disease while on the train to the camp and died soon after reaching 
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Conclusion 
The principal function of the historian is to chronicle past events and interpret 
-their meaning. This act of interpretation should be conducted in such a way that it 
explicates the emergence of the present from the past, breaching the gaps in time that 
in human consciousness seem to separate the immediate present from what has gone 
before; that is, showing the continuity of past and present. Historical interpretation 
should also show the link between the public events that fall under the rubric "history," 
the personal events that comprise an individual life, and their mutual interplay. Met-
aphorically speaking, an event can be conceptualized as simultaneously occupying a 
point on the "horizontal" axis of linear time and on a "vertical" axis where individual 
and collective experiences merge. Explaining events in terms of various levels of 
meaning tries to do justice to their depth and complexity. 
The aim of this paper has been to present just such an interpretation of the 
experience of the city of Indianapolis during the Great Pandemic of 1918. The account 
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presented has been a detailed one in order to give a sense of the health crisis as it 
developed-first looming on the horizon, far off in New England, next appearing in 
other cities in Indiana, and finally arriving in Indianapolis where it quickly became an 
epidemic. This public event was placed ~n a larger geographic and social context by 
including descriptions of Spanish flu in other communities in Indiana-and to a lesser 
extent-in military camps, and by describing the state of medicine and public health at 
the time. The connections between the collective, public event and the lives of ordinary 
people were made by balancing the impersonality of mortality statistics with anecdotal 
material illustrating the loss and waste represented by the death of the pandemic's 
individual victims. It is to be hoped that this treatment has captured in some degree 
the complexity of a traumatic period in the history of the-city of Indianapolis. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Deaths From Influenza and Pneumonia 
in Indiana Cities 
September-December 1918 
Total Death 
~ iliL. NUY. !ill.. D~aths ~ 
Gary 10 110 145 78 343 11.4 
Hammond 4 139 52 38 233 8.4 
Connersville 0 26 8 28 62 7.5 
East Chicago 9 165 35 26 235 7.4 
Elwood 0 5 13 47 65 5.9 
Logansport 1 45 32 36 114 5.3 
Laporte 2 8 26 34 70 5.0 
Lafayette 22 44 5 35 106 4.9 
Lebanon 0 11 13 10 34 4.8 
Princeton 0 21 5 6 32 4.8 
Brazil 0 10 21 19 50 4.7 
Frankfort 1 19 20 7 47 4.7 
Clinton 0 8 16 13 37 4.5 
Whiting 1 23 9 4 37 4.5 
Jeffersonville 0 18 11 17 46 4.4 
Bedford 0 28 8 11 47 4.3 
New Albany 3 65 19 15 102 4.3 
SouthBend 3 147 97 62 309 4.2 
Elkhart 1 25 24 44 94 4.1 
Evansville 5 117 101 91 314 4.0 
Mishawaka 1 8 44 18 71 4.0 
Wabash 0 7 10 17 34 3.9 
Vincennes 0 7 22 39 68 3.8 
Kokomo 2 25 32 24 83 3.7 
Columbus 0 3 14 17 34 3.6 
Indianapolis 34 430 303 247 1,014 3.5 
Madison 1 3 10 10 24 3.5 
TerreHaute 4 47 109 78 238 3.5 
Bloomington 1 14 11 14 40 3.4 
Crawfordsville 0 19 14 6 39 3.3 
Richmond 2 26 33 22 83 3.3 
Huntington 0 3 9 23 35 3.2 
Shelbyville 0 20 5 12 37 3.2 
Goshen 0 12 11 4 27 3.0 
Seymour 0 6 3 9 18 2.9 
Washington 0 9 5 9 23 2.9 
Linton 1 3 10 7 21 2.8 
Anderson 1 11 10 43 65 2.7 
Michigan City 0 10 21 30 61 2.7 
Valparaiso 2 8 6 2 18 2.4 
Newcastle 0 12 4 16 32 2.2 
Greensburg 1 2 0 9 12 2.1 
Peru 1 5 9 12 27 2.1 
Muncie 3 9 8 29 49 1.9 
Marion 0 1 14 21 36 1.8 
Fort Wayne 4 26 23 84 137 1.7 
Mount Vernon 0 0 1 9 10 1.7 
Hartford City 0 0 0 6 6 0.9 
Kendallville 0 2 2 1 5 0.8 
• Deaths per thousand 
Source: Monthly Bulletin, Indiana State Board of Health, 9/18, p.107; 10/18, p.ll7; 11/18, p.135; 12/18, p.147 
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Indianapolis Star, 21 October 1918, p. 2, "Volunteer Doctors Join in War on 
Epidemic." The action of the Lake Division Red Cross was reported in the 
Indianapolis Star, 23 October 1918, p. 1, "Bureaus to Enroll Influenza Nurses." 
50 Indianapolis News, 25 October 1918, p. 13, "Teachers Urged to Help." 
51 Indianapolis Star, 24 October 1918, p. 8, "Asks Home Care of Flu Victims." 
52 Amos Butler was quoted in the Indianapolis News, 30 October 1918, p. 1, "Tomor-
row to See End of Ban in City." Regarding life insurance, Alfred Crosby notes in 
America's Forgotten Pandemic, p. 312, that as a result of the number of claims 
paid out to survivors of Spanish influenza victims, 37 out of 48 life insurance 
companies in the U.S. were obliged to omit or reduce dividends. The Equitable 
Life Assurance Society paid out claims in the week of October 30, 1918, that were 
745 percent higher than those paid in the same week in 1917; Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company disbursed $24 million dollars more in claims than actuaries 
had predicted. 
53 The information in this and the next two paragraphs is from the Indianapolis Star, 
22 November 1918, p. 1, "Health Board Asks Aid as Flu Alarms." 
54 Reference to the fourteen councils that were formed appeared in the Indianapolis 
News, 29 November 1918, p. 21, "Only 55 New Influenza Cases in Last 24 Hours." 
55 Indianapolis Star, 13 December 1918, p. 3, "Scientists Widely Split on Epidemic 
Measures." 
56 The cases in Peru and Bedford were reported in the Indianapolis News, 24 
September 1918, p. 11, "Four Influenza Cases in One Family at Peru," and 25 
September 1918, p. 13, "Influenza Condition Exists at Springville." The Anderson 
case was mentioned in the Indianapolis News, 9 October 1918, p. 8, "Influenza and 
Pneumonia Reports." The destination of inductees from Indiana is from Stephen 
E. Bower, A History of Fort Benjamin Harrison, 1903-1982 (Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Command History Office, Fort Benjamin Harrison, 1984), p. 17. He says that in 
1917 most Army inductees in Indiana were sent to Camp Zachary Taylor. Judging 
from the reports of flu deaths in the newspapers, I concluded that Camps Sherman 
and Grant and Great Lakes Naval Training Station also received many Hoosiers. 
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57 Benton County was mentioned in the Indianapolis Star, 14 October 1918, p. 2, 
"Abatement Seen in Influenza Cases." The spread of influenza from north and 
central Indiana to the south was reported in the Indianapolis Star, 16 October 
1918, p. 16, "State Flu Not Yet On Decline." I obtained the rest of the information 
in this paragraph and the next by grouping data from the flu and pneumonia 
reports printed in the newspapers according to date and county in order to get a 
more coherent picture of how the epidemic progressed in the state. Crosby notes 
the spread of flu from cities and towns into rural areas in America's Forgotten 
Pandemic, p. 56. 
58 References to Christmas cancellations appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 18 
December 1918, p. 9, "Influenza Conditions." The Muncie item was reported in 
the Indianapolis News, 25 October 1918, p. 18, "Halloween [sic] Under Ban." The 
existence of early closing bans was reported in the Indianapolis News, 7 October 
1918, p. 1, "Influenza Situation as It Affects State." 
59 The story about Kokomo's ban appeared in the Indianapolis News, 15 October 
1918, p. 12, "Rescind Health Order on Dealers' Protest." The story about the 
Bicknell health officer appeared in the Indianapolis News, 16 November 1918, p. 
20, "Influenza Situation Serious at Bicknell." The Vincennes resignation was 
reported in the Indianapolis News, 9 December 1918, p. 3, "City Health Officer 
Resigns." The challenge of the ban by theater managers in Terre Haute appeared 
in the Indianapolis News, 29 November 1918, p. 1, "Theater Men to Test Health 
Board Action." Religious opposition to the closing ban in South Bend was 
reported in the Indianapolis Star, 2 November 1918, p. 5, "Pastors Oppose Flu 
Ban, One Placed Under Arrest." 
60 The reference to a masking order in Richmond and Newcastle appeared in the 
Indianapolis Star, 21 November 1918, p. 5, "30 New Cases in Richmond" and 
"Newcastle Puts on Masks." Masking in Lawrenceburg was reported in the 
Indianapolis News, 29 November 1918, p. 11, "Conditions in the State." The 
masking order in Huntington was reported in the Indianapolis News, 10 December 
1918, p. 5, "Masks Ordered at Huntington." The reference to masks in Lawrence 
County is taken from the Indianapolis Star, 3 November 1918, p. 7, "Flu Conditions 
in State." The experience in Brazil was reported in the Indianapolis News, 27 
November 1918, p. 4, "Conditions in State," and the Indianapolis Star, 4 December 
1918, p. 3, "Influenza Conditions." The reference to Fort Wayne appeared in the 
Indianapolis News, 10 December 1918, p. 5, "Conditions in the State." The 
118 
reference to Grant County is taken from the Indianapolis News, 9 December 1918, 
p. 3, "One Thousand Cases at Marion." 
61 The reference to Brazil and Greensburg appeared in Indianapolis News, 7 October 
1918, p. 4, "Influenza and Pneumonia Reports." The Anderson reference was in 
the Indianapolis News, 9 October 1918, p. 8, "Influenza and Pneumonia Reports." 
The Shelbyville ban was reported in the Indianapolis News, 12 October 1918, p. 
20, "Three Shelby County Deaths," and the South Bend order in the Indianapolis 
News, 18 October 1918, p. 20, "Conditions in the State." 
62 The reference to Muncie was in the Indianapolis News, 9 December 1918, p. 3, 
"Meeting Held at Muncie." The Lutheran Hospital shut-down was reported in 
the Indianapolis News, 10 December 1918, "Conditions in the State." The item 
about the Masonic home was in the Indianapolis News, 27 December 1918, p. 12, 
"Influenza Bans Lifted." 
63 The closing of Indiana University was reported in the Indianapolis News, 10 
October 1918, p. 8, "State University Puts Closing ·order in Force." The story 
about President Bryan appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 15 October 1918, p. 4, 
"I.U. President Helps as Nurse." 
64 The reference to the Boys School is from the Indianapolis Star, 21 October 1918, 
p. 1, "Red Cross to Help State in Flu Fight." Flu at Jeffersonville was reported in 
the Indianapolis Star, 21 December 1918, p. 4, "Influenza Conditions." Flu in Fort 
Wayne was reported in the Indianapolis Star, 12 December 1918, p. 9, "41 
Counties Report 2,315 New Cases oflnfluenza." Reference to flu in Rush County 
appeared in the Indianapolis News, 15 November 1918, p. 8, "Influenza Is Serious 
in Many Places Again." 
65 References to Elks facilities appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 24 October 1918, 
p. 5, "Cases in Other Cities"; 19 November 1918, p. 4, "Flu Claims 18 in Day at 
Gary"; and in the Indianapolis News, 31 October 1918, p. 10, "Influenza Condi-
tions Improved in the State." The Bicknell reference was in the Indianapolis News, 
16 November 1918, p. 20, "Influenza Situation Serious at Bicknell." The Terre 
Haute reference was in the Indianapolis News, 29 October 1918, p. 13, "Terre 
Haute Business Men to Fight Disease." Brown County's plight was reported in 
the Indianapolis News, 29 November 1918, p. 11, "Only Four Physicians to Fight 
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the Influenza," and the Indianapolis Star, 7 December 1918, p. 3, "Influenza 
Conditions." 
66 Indianapolis News, 10 December 1918, p. 22, "New Cases at Muncie." 
67 The circus reference appeared in the Indianapolis News, 10 October 1918, p. 10, 
"Circus Forced into Quarters." The flower famine was reported in the Indianap-
olis News, 9 December 1918, p. 22, "Cut Flower Famine Is in Evidence at Muncie." 
68 References to the Richmond Casket Co. were in the Indianapolis Star, 16 October 
1918, p. 4, "Rush Order for Caskets," and 20 October 1918, p. 5, "Casket Plants 
Are Rushed." The plea for simple coffins was reported in the Indianapolis Star, 
21 October 1918, p. 11, "Fancy Coffins Restricted to Speed Production." 
69 Indianapolis Star, 12 December 1918, p. 5, "Flu Deaths Fill Cemetery." 
70 Coal output on the national level was referred to in the Indianapolis Star, 4 
November 1918, p. 1, "Flu Hits Coal Output." Declines in coal production in 
Indiana was reported in the Indianapolis News, 27 November 1918, p. 4, "Drastic 
Action at Bicknell." 
71 Indianapolis Star, 27 October 1918, p. 15, "Sale of Stamps Hindered by Flu." 
72 The reference to the Shelby County draft board appeared in the Indianapolis 
News, 18 October 1918, p. 20, "Shelby County Has an Increase in Influenza." 
Reference to the Elkhart board was in the Indianapolis News, 12 October 1918, 
p. 2, "Epidemic Halts Draft Tests." The troop train story was in the Indianapolis 
News, 25 October 1918, p. 18, "Soldiers Taken Off Train." 
73 See Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic, p. 64 for a discussion of the unpre-
dictable effects of the pandemic from city to city in the United States. 
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Chapter 4 
1 Indianapolis Star, 14 December 1918, p. 2, "Chicago Doctors Study Masks as 
Anti-Flu Agent." 
2 Indianapolis Star, 13 December 1918, p. 3, "Scientists Widely Split on Epidemic 
Measures." 
3 Alfred W. Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 269-270. 
4 Information about experimental efforts to induce influenza and the material in the 
following paragraph come from W.I.B. Beveridge, Influenza: The Last Great 
Plague (New York: Prodist, 1977), pp. 2-9. 
5 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
6 Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic, p. 84. 
7 The history ofinfluenza appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 6 October 1918, p. 6, 
"Influenza Like Grip Pandemic." The reference to droplet infection comes from 
the Indianapolis Star, 14 September 1918, p. 9, "How to Avoid Spanish Flu." 
8 Beveridge, Influenza, pp. 47-48. 
9 Indianapolis Star, 5 October 1918. 
10 Dr. Hurty was quoted in the Indianapolis Star, 20 October 1918, p. 3, "Beware of 
Cold, Hurty Advises." Dr. Morgan's comments were reported in the Indianapolis 
News, 24 September 1918, p. 18, "To Prevent Influenza." 
11 Interview, Celeste Jaffe, with Julia Butwin, Donnell P. Ewert, and Chun Zhou, 
Indiana State Board of Health, Indianapolis, Indiana, 28 February 1994. 
12 The reference to the state of knowledge at the time of the pandemic came from 
the Indianapolis Star, 14 September 1918, p. 9, "How to Avoid Spanish Flu." 
Current knowledge about influenza transmission appears in Beveridge, Influenza, 
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p. 49, except for the observation that shedding occurs two to five days before 
symptoms appear, which I learned from Julia Butwin of the State Board of Health. 
13 Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic, p. 101. 
14 Dr. Morgan's warning appeared in the Indianapolis News, 24 September 1918, 
p. 18, "To Prevent Influenza." 
15 The observation of doctors in Boston that many influenza cases developed into 
pneumonia appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 11 September 1918, p. 1, "Grip and 
Influenza Gain in New York and Boston." I obtained the current health informa-
tion in this paragraph during my interview with Martha Bennington, Senior Nurse 
Epidemiologist, Marion County Health Department, 28 February 1994. 
16 Dr. Morgan's advice can be found in the Indianapolis News, 24 September 1918, 
p. 18, "To Prevent Influenza." The state board of health circular was quoted in 
the Indianapolis Star, 13 October 1918, p. 12, "Influenza Not to Halt Plants." The 
instructions of the Chicago Health Department are from Crosby, America's 
Forgotten Pandemic, p. 53. 
17 Charles E. Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers: The Rise of America's Hospital 
System (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987), p. 72. 
18 The advertisement for Carter's Little Liver Pills appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 
2 October 1918, p. 10; Dr. Caldwell's product was advertised in the Indianapolis 
Star, 10 October 1918, p. 8; Cascarets were advertised in the Indianapolis Star, 21 
November 1918, p. 5. 
19 Father John's was advertised in the Indianapolis Star, 10 October 1918, p. 12; Dr. 
Pierce's medicines were advertised in the Indianapolis Star, 8 November 1918, 
p. 9. 
20 The Nostriola ad appeared in the Indianapolis News, 11 October 1918, p. 18; the 
Vick's ad was in the Indianapolis Star, 13 October 1918, p. 10; Kondon's was 
advertised in the Indianapolis News, 17 October 1918, p. 23. 
21 The Peruna ad appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 13 October 1918, p. 8; the ad 
for Miller's Antiseptic Oil was in the Indianapolis News, 25 October 1918, p. 25. 
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22 The Scott's Emulsion ad appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 24 October 1918, p. 3; 
the ad for Borden's was in the Indianapolis News, 30 October 1918, p. 9; the ad 
for Lysol and Horlick's was in the Indianapolis News, 31 October 1918, p. 3. 
23 Indianapolis Star, 27 October 1918, p. 1, "Public Is Warned of Flu Remedies." 
24 Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., "The Influenza Pandemic of 1918," in Influenza in America 
1918-1976, ed. June E. Osborn (New York: Prodist, 1977), p. 5. 
25 The information about India comes from Beveridge, Influenza, p. 31; the other 
mortality statistics appear in Richard Collier, The Plague of the Spanish Lady 
(New York: Atheneum, 1974), p. 305. 
26 The mortality rates among native Americans during the colonial period are 
described in Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., The Columbian Exchange: Biological and 
Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing 
Company, 1972), p. 37. Crosby mentions the native American experience during 
the Great Pandemic in America's Forgotten Pandemic (p. 228) where he also notes 
that in 1918 black Americans, in the age groups 20-45, had lower death rates from 
all causes than their white counterparts. This anomaly may be due to the fact that 
a greater proportion of black persons-being generally more susceptible than 
whites to respiratory diseases-may have contracted flu in the spring wave and 
thereby gained some degree of immunity to the fall wave. 
27 The reference to the problems estimating the flu deaths in the United States is 
taken from Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic, p. 204. Crosby does not 
explain the reason that not all states were included in the Original Death Regis-
tration Area, but Thurman B. Rice does (The Hoosier Health Officer,Indianapo-
lis, 1946, p. 87). Only those states that had adopted accurate methods of 
registering vital statistics could be included; thanks to the efforts of the redoubt-
able John Hurty, Indiana was one of them. After ammendments that Hurty had 
advocated became part of the state health law in 1899, doctors were obligated to 
report births and deaths to the local health officer; also, burial permits were 
required for an internment, but could be issued by the health officer only after he 
had received a signed death certificate from a physician. The following year, as a 
direct result of this progressive legislation, the Census Bureau added Indiana to 
the six New England states, New York, New Jersey, and Michigan that comprised 
the Registration Area. This was something of an accomplishment and one that 
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was not shared at the time by Ohio and Illinois, both of which were more populous 
and prosperous than Indiana or Michigan. A zealous proponent of the use of 
statistics in disease prevention and health promotion, Hurty struggled long and 
hard to enforce this law and was still doing so when the epidemic struck. 
28 The information in this and the next paragraph comes from Crosby, America's 
Forgotten Pandemic, pp. 205-207. 
29 Dannenberg's obituary appeared in the Indianapolis News, 15 October 1918, p. 
12, "Former Mayor's Wife Dead." Morgan's appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 
16 October 1918, p. 4, "Greensburg Boy Is Taken." 
30 The reference to Fort Dix is taken from the Indianapolis Star, 26 September 1918, 
p. 10 "42 Deaths at Camp Dix;" the story about Camp Sherman is in the Indianap-
olis News, 7 October 1918, p. 5, "Mothers Go to Camp Despite Influenza." Private 
Witmer's death notice appeared in the Indianapolis News, 12 October 1918, p. 2, 
"Epidemic Halts Draft Tests." The notice mentioned that Witmer's wife had died 
on June 1 and that his 9-week-old son had died in At!gust, a reminder that in 1918 
death in childbirth was not uncommon and high infant mortality rates were still a 
part of life. Another death notice, Indianapolis News, 16 October 1918, p. 4 
"Deaths at Columbia City," illustrated the relative precariousness of young 
children's lives in the era before widespread vaccinations. Helen Sweeney, 14, died 
of influenza in Columbia City on October 16, 1918. In 1915, her parents had lost 
three younger children to the measles in the space of one week. 
31 The item about Miami University is from the Indianapolis News, 7 October 1918, 
p. 4, "Improvement at Miami." The story about Edward Carman is from the 
Indianapolis News, 17 October 1918, p. 10, "Conditions in the State." 
32 John Abels' death notice appeared in the Indianapolis News, 9 October 1918, p. 
8, "Influenza and Pneumonia Reports." The reference to influenza contracted 
while bringing a body home for burial is taken from the Indianapolis Star, 25 
October 1918, p. 5, "Flu Conditions in State." The government policy of subsidiz-
ing transportation costs is mentioned in the Indianapolis Star, 26 September 1918, 
p. 10, "42 Deaths at Camp Dix." 
33 Joseph Risen beck's death was reported in the Indianapolis News, 10 October 1918, 
p. 8, "Husband Dies, Wife Ill." Helen Stout's obituary was in the Indianapolis Star, 
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20 November 1918, p. 9, "Obituary." John Richardson's death notice was in the 
Indianapolis News, 14 October 1918, p. 3, "Physician on Way, Man Dies." 
34 Jesse Felts' death notice appeared in the Indianapolis News, 21 September 1918, 
p. 2, "Dies at Lakes Naval Station." Warren Walters' obituary was in the India-
napolis News, 12 October 1918, p. 20, "27 New Cases at Logansport." Harold 
Densmore's death was reported in the Indianapolis News, 14 October 1918, p. 3, 
"Goshen Reports Three Deaths." Jack Matheson's obituary appeared in the 
Indianapolis News, 15 October 1918, p. 14, "Conditions in the State." 
35 The story of the Indianapolis family was in the Indianapolis News, 18 October 1918, 
p. 21, "Babies Die, 14 Others Sick, Family Destitute." The Ringer family's ordeal 
was reported in the Indianapolis News, 29 October 1918, p. 1, "Crawls Mile on 
Hands and Knees to Highway." 
36 The Wallace's deaths were reported in the Indianapolis News, 10 October 1918, 
p. 8, "Man and Wife Are Victims." Notice of the Meldrums' deaths appeared in 
the Indianapolis Star, 7 December 1918, p. 16, '"Funeral of Man and Wife, 
Pneumonia Victims, Today." William Dierking's death was reported in the Indi-
anapolis Star, 20 October 1918, p. 4, "Wife and Husband Die." Edna Harmon's 
death notice appeared in the Indianapolis News, 20 November 1918, p. 5, "Brazil: 
Husband and Wife Expire." 
37 The estimate of the number of orphans in Indiana was reported in the Indianapolis 
Star, 3 January 1919, p. 6, "Thousands Made Orphans by Epidemic in Indiana." 
According to the Indiana State Board of Health, Monthly Bulletin, XXI (Decem-
ber, 1918), p. 148, an additional 1,379 married people died from influenza and 
pneumonia during December. Using the estimation method described in the body 
of the paper, there were a total of 8,304 children orphaned by the epidemic 
between September 1 and December 31, 1918. The story of the McCarthy 
children's lives in-and ultimately, their deliverance from-the unhappy foster 
home is told in Memories of a Catholic Girlhood (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Co., 1957), pp. 5-80 . 
38 The O'Connell deaths were reported in the Indianapolis News, 7 October 1918, p. 
4, "Disea·se Spreads Rapidly." Florence Pickens' death notice appeared in the 
Indianapolis Star, 3 November 1918, p. 1, "Nurse Dies of Influenza." The Mason 
obituary was in the Indianapolis News, 27 November 1918, p. 8, "Mother and Son 
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Die." The Mitchell deaths were in the Indianapolis News, 1 December 1918, p. 
15, "Mother and Child Dead." The obituary for the Isenhower brothers appeared 
in the Indianapolis Star, 7 December 1918, p. 15, "Death From Flu Follows 
Brother's Only 5 Days." The deaths of the Vest children were reported in the 
Indianapolis Star, 19 November 1918, p. 4, "Four in Family Die." The deaths in 
the Langdon family were reported in the Indianapolis News, 20 November 1918, 
p. 5, "Three in Family Die." 
39 Col. Hagadorn's suicide was reported in the Indianapolis News, 8 October 1918, 
p. 1, "Col. Hagadorn Takes Life at Camp Grant." Dr. Sudranski's suicide was 
reported in the Indianapolis News, 28 October 1918, p. 4, "Physician Kills Self." 
The story about Lavinia Burbrink appeared in the Indianapolis News, 12 October 
1918, p. 17, "Husband Dies, Wife Loses Reason." 
40 Indianapolis News, 16 November 1918, p. 1, "Letter Ends Mystery About Missing 
Woman." 
41 Indianapolis Star, 16 December 1918, p. 8, "Deafu Takes Principal in Grave 
Divorce Suit." 
42 William DePrez Inlow, "The Indiana Physician in World War I," in One Hundred 
Years of Indiana Medicine, ed. Dorothy R. Russo (Indianapolis: Indiana State 
Medical Association, 1949), p. 102. 
43 Chloe Miller's death notice appeared in the Indianapolis Star, 5 November 1918, 
p. 5, "Nurse Dies of Influenza While Fighting Epidemic." Eileen Miller's obituary 
was in the Indianapolis News, 18 October 1918, p. 20, "Nurse Pneumonia Victim." 
Sr. Patrice Kennedy's death was reported in the Indianapolis Star, 24 October 
1918, p. 7, "Obituary." Catherine Libka's obituary appeared in the Indianapolis 
Star, 25 November 1918, p. 12, "Surgery Superintendent at City Hospital Dead." 
Mary Edna Fletcher's death notice was in the Indianapolis Star, 4 December 1918, 
p. 7, "Popular Nurse, Veteran of Methodist Hospital, Is Dead." Beatrice Davis' 
death was reported in the Indianapolis Star, 12 December 1918, p. 3, "Local Nurse 
Contracts Influenza and Dies." Ethel Leach's obituary appeared in the Indianap-
olis Star, 2 October 1918, p. 7, "Local Nurse Dies in East." Pauline Collins' death 
was reported in the Indianapolis Star, 9 November 1918, p. 7, "Indianapolis Nurse 
Expires of Pneumonia at Universal." Florence LeClaire's death notice appeared 
in the Indianapolis News, 10 October 1918, p. 10, "Influenza and Pneumonia Reports." 
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